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THE PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN POLAND 
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.  
DOCTRINE, DRAFTS AND LAW  
IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Abstract 
Three fundamental state system and legal transformations, which took place in Poland 
in the 20th century, make the history of the Polish law of civil procedure an important and 
intriguing research thread, especially in a comparative perspective. The aim of this article is to 
demonstrate the problem of the principles of civil procedure in codification works which were 
in progress before the regaining of independence in 1918. They were continued in the Second 
Republic of Poland and developed further after the Second World War until the second Polish Code 
of Civil Procedure was adopted in 1964. Codification works in the Second Republic of Poland and 
the People’s Republic of Poland were quite different regarding their determinants and also 
conditions. However both presented the phenomenon of a deviation from the original assumptions 
and concepts, which were postulated by the authors of the original drafts. Such deviation was 
usually adverse. The changing fate of Polish civil procedure did not threaten the heritage of Polish 
jurisprudence. The adversarial and dispositive principles, as well as the principle of oral proceedings 
and the principle of the free appraisal of evidence were constantly present in the Polish legal 
system. Nevertheless, after World War II some significant modifications were imposed that limited 
the autonomy of the parties and the independence of the court owing to the political subordination 
to the Soviet Union. However, the attitude of the majority of Polish lawyers enabled many standards 
of the classic judicial proceedings to be maintained, and thereby also the relations with the 
European doctrine of procedural law. 
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN THE VIEWS OF THE AUTHORS  
OF THE DRAFTS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND POLISH CODES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE – A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Anna Stawarska-Rippel 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION  
  
 The last century in Poland, full of fundamental transformations  
of the state system, resulted in the codification (19301), followed  
by the decodification (19502), and recodification (19643) of civil procedure.  
 The codification works that had been undertaken twice in Poland seem 
quite distant owing to the various determiners and conditions in which 
they were led4. After the 1st World War, when Poland regained  
its independence, the issues of integrating Polish lands that were torn apart 
by the partitions (1772-95), and restoring Polish statehood, became those  
of the highest importance. In the context of the legal systems mosaic that 
was in force at that time5 it was mainly a political issue6: “Such a diversity 
                                                   
1  Decree-Law of President of the Republic of Poland from 29.11.1930 The Code of Civil 
Procedure, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] 1930, No. 83, item 651; uniform text – Dz.U. [Journal  
of Laws] 1932, No. 112, item 934. 
2  Act from 20.07.1950 amending the regulations of civil proceedings, Dz.U. [Journal  
of Laws] 1950, No. 38, item 349; uniform text – Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] 1950, No. 43, item 394. 
3  Act from 17.11.1964 the Code of Civil Procedure, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] 1964, No. 43, 
item 269.  
4  This article contains some considerations and conclusion included in the monograph  
A. Stawarska-Rippel, Elementy prywatne i publiczne w procesie cywilnym w świetle prac 
kodyfikacyjnych w Polsce (1918-1964). Studium historycznoprawne [Private and Public Aspects  
in the Civil Procedure in the Light of Works on the Codification in Poland (1918-1964). Legal-
Historical Study], Katowice 2015. 
5  After independence in 1918, five different legal systems were in force: a German system 
in western Poland, Austrian in the South, Russian in eastern Poland, Russian, Polish  
and French law in central Poland and Hungarian Law in small parts of Szepes and Orava  
in southern Poland. 
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of legislation with its strong influence on private-legal relations makes  
us four, or at least three nations that live in separate legal conceptions 
imbued with various, often contrary views and beliefs”7. A regional 
patriotism came about as a natural result of that: “Law forces itself into  
all aspects of human life and unnoticeably descends to the depth of human 
soul; exercitio iuris becomes consuetudo, then it transforms into inveterata 
consuetudo, which is alter natura. So what is so surprising in a man fighting 
for what has become his second nature, for the law that he has become 
accustomed to”8. 
 The existing legal mosaic led to some obstacles which, in the context  
of the codifying works that were begun in Poland, and stressed in the 
speech of the eminent French civil law specialist François Gény in Warsaw 
in November 19219, led the reborn Republic of Poland to become not only 
a national legislative work campus, but a specific “laboratory of law and 
comparative legislation”10, which made it possible to “research and 
compare the value of the modern Polish law – de lege ferenda – from lex lata 
of the foreign law”11 as well12. Emphasising on the specific situation of the 
                                                                                                                           
6  A. Lityński, Pół wieku kodyfikacji prawa w Polsce (1919-1969). Zagadnienia wybrane [Half  
of a Century of Codification of Law in Poland (1919-1969). Selected Issues], Tychy 2001, p. 31. 
7  Przemówienie H. Konica, przewodniczącego podkomisji redakcyjnej na zebraniu u Prezydenta 
Rzeczypospolitej w dniu 18 lutego 1925 r. [Speech of H. Konic, Chairman of the Editorial Committee 
at the Meeting with President of Republic of Poland on 18 February 1925], Gazeta Sądowa 
Warszawska [Warsaw Judicial Gazette] 1925, no. 9, p. 140. 
8  J. Skąpski, System środków prawnych w projekcie polskiej procedury cywilnej [The System  
of Legal Remedies in the Draft of Polish Civil Procedure], Głos Prawa [The Voice of Law] 1927,  
no. 12, p. 432. This statement quoted earlier L. Górnicki, Działalność kodyfikacyjna Józefa 
Skąpskiego seniora [Contribution of Józef Skąpski Senior in the Codification Works], [in:]  
R. Majkowska, L. Nowak (eds), Józef Skąpski ojciec 1868-1950, Józef Skąpski syn 1921-1998 [Józef 
Skąpski Father 1868-1950, Józef Skąpski Son 1921-1998], Kraków 2014, p. 67. 
9  K. Sójka-Zielińska, Organizacja prac nad kodyfikacją prawa cywilnego w Polsce 
międzywojennej [Organisation of the Codification Works on the Civil Law in Interwar Poland], 
Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne [Journal of Law and History] 1975, vol. 2, p. 276;  
L. Górnicki, Prawo cywilne w pracach Komisji Kodyfikacyjnej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 
1919-1939 [The Civil Law in the Works of the Codification Committee of the Second Republic  
of Poland 1919-39], Wrocław 2000, p. 84. 
10  Sprawozdanie Sekretarza Generalnego prof. E.S. Rappaporta, z dziesięcioletniej działalności 
Komisji Kodyfikacyjnej (1919-1929) [Report of the Secretary-General Prof. E.S. Rappaport, From  
the Ten Years of Conduct of the Codification Committee (1919-1929)], Komisja Kodyfikacyjna 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Dział ogólny [Codification Committee of the Second Republic  
of Poland, General Section], tome I, vol. 12, Warszawa 1929, p. 373. 
11  Ibidem. 
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reborn Poland, in the light of the situation of other post-war countries,  
F. Gény pointed out that states including: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,  
and Romania spread the highest applied legislation onto the new 
territories or reformed the legal state in force13. In such a context it is 
interesting to look at the example of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes, which had been under the influence of Austrian law for a long 
time. However the reception of Austrian institutions in fact did not take 
place. Practice followed its own autonomous way, mainly owing to 
political reasons. Furthermore, an almost ten-year period until the 
outbreak of the world war did not allow the solutions of the Yugoslavian 
Code of Civil Procedure (1929) based on the Austrian Code to take root14.  
 Codification work in Poland after the First World War, which was 
unprecedented in Europe and even in the world, resulted in the first Polish 
Code of Civil Procedure – an original work, which was the outcome  
of many years of hard work on the part of the most prominent Polish 
lawyers. This Code, which was applied in its original version for less than 
twenty years, was in force after the Second World War, but in a mutilated, 
marginalised form, until the second Polish Code of Civil Procedure entered 
into force. 
 After the Second World War, the countries which were under the 
influence of the USSR faced the problem of making radical changes in their 
legal systems. Some of them, such as Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, began 
recodification of the procedural law. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, 
codified its Code of Civil Procedure for the first time. However Romania 
was an exception. The Romanian Code of Civil Procedure of 1865, which 
                                                                                                                           
12  Recently in the context of a tasks of legal comparative studies in the field of civil 
procedure see K. Lubiński, Komparatystyka prawa a unifikacja i kodyfikacja polskiego prawa 
procesowego cywilnego w okresie międzywojennym [Legal Comparative Studies and Unification and 
also Codification of Polish Civil Procedure in the Interwar Period], [in:] A. Wudarski (ed.), Polska 
komparatystyka prawa. Prawo obce w doktrynie prawa polskiego [Polish Legal Comparative Studies. 
Foreign Law in Polish Doctrine of Law], Warszawa 2016, pp. 347-364. About the first Polish code 
of civil procedure in a comparison to the German, Austrian, Russian, and French civil 
procedure see A. Polkowski, Die polnische Zivilprozessordnung von 1930/1933. Unter 
Berücksichtigung des deutschen, österreichischen, russischen und französischen Recht, Frankfurt  
am Main 2009.  
13  Sójka-Zielińska, supra note 9, p. 276; Górnicki, supra note 9, p. 84. 
14  A. Uzelac, Accelerating Civil Proceedings in Croatia – A History of Attempts to Improve  
the Efficiency of Civil Litigation, [in:] C.H. van Rhee (ed.), The Law’s Delay. Essays on Undue 
Delay in Civil Litigation, Antwerpen–Groningen 2004, p. 288. 
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was based on the French Code of Civil Procedure (1806), survived the time 
of the people’s state. In the German Democratic Republic (GDR) the Code 
of Civil Procedure of 1877 went through fundamental changes on the  
8th of November 1933 and was in force till 1975. It has been revised three 
times since the Second World War15.  
 Creating a new legal system and accepting socialist models of civil 
procedure resulted in fact in a great and forced unification of procedural 
law in the people’s democracy countries. That unification was done very 
quickly. In the context of unification and codification it is interesting that 
the first and entire codification in the whole history of Russia took place  
in the USSR. Under this codification was created the first separate Code  
of Civil Procedure (1923)16. It is also noticeable that the law in all the 
republics of the Soviet Union was unified according to the principles of the 
legislation which was issued under the provisions of the Supreme Council 
of the USSR on 11th February 195717. The unification was announced in the 
constitution of 1924, which authorised the USSR to create foundations  
for the administration of justice system and legal proceedings as well  
as civil and criminal law.  
 The beginnings of assimilating the Soviet patterns in Polish judicial  
law are perceived in the context of the political turnabout in 1948, but  
                                                   
15  E. Wengerek, [in:] M. Cappelletti, B.G. Garth (eds), International Encyclopedia  
of Comparative Law, vol. XVI Civil Procedure, chapt. 1 Introduction – Policies, Trends and Ideas  
in Civil Procedure, Tübingen-Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster 1987, pp. 142-144. 
16  A. Stawarska-Rippel, O pierwszym radzieckim kodeksie procedury cywilnej. Postępowanie 
cywilne od dekretów o sądzie do początków rekodyfikacji radzieckiego prawa [On the First Soviet Code 
of Civil Procedure. Civil Proceedings from the Decrees on the Court until the Beginnings of Soviet 
Law Recodification], [in:] M. Mikołajczyk, J. Ciągwa, P. Fiedorczyk, A. Stawarska-Rippel,  
T. Adamczyk, W. Organiściak, K. Kuźmicz (eds), O prawie i jego dziejach księgi dwie. Studia 
ofiarowane Profesorowi Adamowi Lityńskiemu w czterdziestopięciolecie pracy naukowej  
i siedemdziesięciolecie urodzin [On Law and Its History Books Two. Study Presented to Professor 
Adam Lityński on his Forty Years of Academic Work and His Seventieth Birthday], Book II, 
Białystok-Katowice 2010, pp. 335-366. 
17  K. Lubiński, Tendencje unifikacyjne w rozwoju prawa postępowania cywilnego [Unification 
Tendencies in the Development of Civil Procedural Law], [in:] A. Marciniak (ed.), Księga 
pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Witolda Broniewicza. Symbolae Vitoldo Broniewicz dedicatae  
[A Commemorative Book in Honour of Professor Witold Broniewicz. Symbolae Vitoldo Broniewicz 
dedicatae], Łódź 1998, p. 230; A. Lityński, Prawo Rosji i ZSRR 1917-1991, czyli historia 
wszechzwiązkowego komunistycznego prawa (bolszewików). Krótki kurs [Law of Russia and USSR 
1917-1991, that is History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Short Course], 
Warszawa 2012, p. 211, p. 287. 
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the reconstruction of procedural law was indicated by a discussion on the 
character of the degree of jurisdiction that took place before the politically 
important year of 1948.  
 The need to carry out works on the changes of the civil procedure  
at a sufficiently high level by an adequate codifying apparatus composed  
of the eminent lawyers was expressed by Marian Waligórski – author of 
canon of the Polish literature of civil procedure18, even before the political 
breakthrough in 1948. Facing the fact that the Codification Committee was 
not reappointed after the second war, as most of its members did not 
survive the war, M. Waligórski stressed the necessity to involve people 
with appropriate qualifications19. This important postulate was ignored for 
political reasons. The latter decodification of civil procedure in the People’s 
Republic (20 July 1950) introduced rushed and excessively socialist 
innovations, which appeared to be quite permanent. The main retrograde 
step in the evolution of Polish civil proceedings at the first stage of the  
so called reform in the People’s Republic, and going deep to its 
fundaments, however, in the preserved archives referred to as a small 
reform, set the permanent direction for “new ways” in Polish civil 
procedure. The decodification of the civil procedure resulted in many 
adverse phenomena, which to a greater or lesser degree accompany every 
state transformation. The inconsistency of regulations favoured creative 
interpretations that enhanced the changes20. The deformation of the first 
Polish Code of Civil Procedure (1930) was made even worse by the draft  
of a new code prepared at the Ministry of Justice (1955), which finally did 
not enter into force. 
 M. Waligórski’s postulate was realised to some extent, as was possible 
at that time, not earlier than in 1956. On the wave of the political “thaw” 
after Stalinism (1956) the effects of works on the changes in civil procedure 
were strongly criticised because of their being perceived as a reflection  
                                                   
18  M. Waligórski, Polskie prawo procesowe cywilne. Funkcja i struktura procesu [Polish Law  
of Civil Procedure. Function and Structure of the Proceedings], Warszawa 1947. 
19  M. Waligórski, Zmiany proceduralne w związku z ostatnią unifikacją prawa cywilnego  [Civil 
Procedural Law Changes in the Context of the Last Unification of the Civil Law], Państwo i Prawo 
[State and Law] 1946, no. 5-6, p. 93. 
20  A. Stawarska-Rippel, Prawo sądowe Polski Ludowej 1944-1950 a prawo Drugiej 
Rzeczypospolitej [The Judicial Law in People’s Poland 1944-1950 and the Law of the Second Republic 
of Poland], Katowice 2006, pp. 95-105, 122-126. 
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of faulty political concepts, the anonymity of the projects, and, above all, 
the lack of a wider participation of the representatives of academic 
lawyers21. The codification work that was undertaken in Poland in 1956 
gave hope to conduct this work far away from ideological, political 
directives and to return to traditional constructions of the law. Relative 
freedom in the Codification Committee of the People’s Republic of Poland 
(established in August 1956) which resulted from liberalisation connected 
with the political breakthrough, ended quickly at the beginning of the 
1960s. At first, the works on the Second Code of Civil Procedure were 
conducted within a positive political atmosphere. They were characterised 
by substantial discussion, supported by comparative analysis beyond 
socialist law and going deeper into the essence of civil proceedings  
in the light of its development and they generated a very good draft (1960) 
that might have constituted evolution. This draft was considered later as 
too innovatory – too “bourgeois”. 
 The following of the Soviet model that was in the process of change 
can be observed in the second edition of the draft of Polish Code of Civil 
Procedure (1964). Some innovations, there were introduced in the 
Fundamentals of civil procedure of the USSR and Union Republics (1961), 
later implemented in the codes of the republics of the USSR22, appeared  
in it too. The recodification of the Soviet civil procedure (1961-1964) of that 
time established new concepts as to the aim and function of civil 
                                                   
21  W. Czachórski, Przebieg prac nad kodyfikacją prawa cywilnego PRL [Conduct of the Work  
on the Civil Law Codification in the People‘s Republic of Poland], Studia Prawnicze [Legal  
Papers] 1970, vol. 26-27, pp. 14-15; S. Grzybowski, Zagadnienia kodyfikacji polskiego prawa 
cywilnego (organizacja i wyniki pracy 1919-1992) [Issues of Codification of Polish Civil Law 
(Organisation and Effects 1919-1992)], Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego [The Private Law 
Quarterly] 1992, vol. 1-4, p. 103; J. Skąpski, Kodeks cywilny z 1964 r. Blaski i cienie kodyfikacji 
oraz jej perspektywy [The Civil Code of 1964. Pros and Cons of Codification and its Prospects], 
Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego [The Private Law Quarterly] 1992, vol. 1-4, pp. 71-73;  
A. Lityński, Na drodze do kodyfikacji prawa cywilnego w Polsce Ludowej [On the Way to the 
Codification of Civil Law in People’s Republic of Poland], [in:] G. Bałtruszajtys (ed.), Prawo wczoraj 
i dziś. Studia dedykowane profesor Katarzynie Sójce-Zielińskiej [Law Yesterday and Today. Studies 
Dedicated to Professor Katarzyna Sójka-Zielińska], Warszawa 2000, pp. 151-153; P. Fiedorczyk, 
Unifikacja i kodyfikacja prawa rodzinnego w Polsce (1945-1964) [The Unification and Codification  
of Family Law in Poland (1945-1964)], Białystok 2014, pp. 288-290. 
22  A. Stawarska-Rippel, O rekodyfikacji radzieckiego postępowania cywilnego [On Recodification 
of the Soviet Civil Procedure], Z Dziejów Prawa [From the History of the Law] 2011, vol. 4(12), 
p. 188 et seq. 
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proceedings, setting the directions for the codification works also in 
Poland. Besides, it was difficult to cross the boundaries that were 
determined in the regression caused by the Act of 1950.  
 That alternately revolutionary and evolutionary direction of changes in 
Polish civil procedure after the Second World War, resulting in a generally 
well-perceived codification, which in its first version was an entity  
of the past era, did not manage to impede the continuity of legal thought  
in civil proceedings23.  
 The effects of the codification works in the civil proceedings that  
were undertaken twice in Poland of the 20th century are known. However, 
the lawmakers’ thought-processes and its sources resulting from the 
preparatory materials are often much more valuable that the code itself: 
“Unfortunately! More than one courageous, independent and pleasant idea 
sparkled and was extinguished because it was not endorsed (…) it was  
not lost for the idea of the development of the proceedings (…) the future, 
that eternal adjuster of life, as Norwid named it, more than once unearths 
abandoned thoughts out from the dust of oblivion”24. 
 
 2. BEFORE INDEPENDENCE IN 1918 AND THE INTERWAR PERIOD  
  
 Even before the regaining of independence by Poland in 1918, when 
the hope of establishing Polish administration of justice arose, in February 
1917 the Provisional Council of the Kingdom of Poland created the 
                                                   
23  J. Gudowski, O kilku naczelnych zasadach procesu cywilnego – wczoraj, dziś i jutro  
[On Some Fundamental Principles of Civil Proceedings – Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow], [in:]  
A. Nowicka (ed.), Prawo prywatne czasu przemian. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Stanisława 
Sołtysińskiego [Private Law in a Period of Changes. A Commemorative Book in Honour of Professor 
Stanisław Sołtysiński], Poznań 2005, p. 1015, 1023; M. Sawczuk, Tradycja a postęp w nowelizacji 
cywilnego prawa sądowego (in statu nascendi) [Tradition and Progress in the Amendment of the Civil 
Judicial Law (in statu nascendi)], Teka Komisji Prawniczej – Ol PAN [TEKA Commission  
of Legal Sciences], Lublin 2008, p. 168; A. Mączyński, Uwagi o stanie nauki polskiego prawa 
cywilnego [Comments on the Condition of the Knowledge of Polish Civil Law], Państwo i Prawo 
[State and Law] 2011, no. 6, pp. 6-8; A. Machnikowska, 50-lecie kodeksu postępowania cywilnego 
z dalekiej i bliskiej perspektywy [50th Anniversary of the Code of Civil Procedure from Far and Close 
up Perspective], Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego [The Private Law Quarterly] 2015, vol. 3,  
p. 551 et seq. 
24  J. Hroboni, Syntetyczna ocena procedury cywilnej w świetle materiałów ustawodawczych 
[Synthetic Assessment of Civil Procedure in the Light of Legislative Materials], Przegląd Prawa  
i Administracji [The Review of Law and Administration] 1931, p. 20. 
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Department of Justice. Its Director at that time, Stanislaw Bukowiecki, 
organised the Civil Law Committee (the Warsaw Committee) in March 
1917. Its first and main task was to prepare a draft of Polish civil 
procedure25. The lack of any strictly Polish tradition in civil procedure led 
the Committee to carry out their own independent comparative research. 
The Committee took into consideration comparative material from foreign 
legislation, especially from French (1806), Russian (1864), German (1877), 
Austrian (1895) and Hungarian (1911) civil proceedings. Polish civil 
procedures were not to be implemented quickly, an event which the 
author, hidden behind initials, was afraid of. He rightly drew attention  
to the fact that confusion in legal relations after regaining independence 
would be inevitable and it should not be deepened26. The same author saw 
the importance of engaging the outstanding experts on civil proceedings, 
the professors of Warsaw, Cracow, and Lvov universities, to work on the 
future Code of Civil Procedure. Because of the need to base the codification 
works on the critical-comparative method he proposed translating the texts 
of the codes of civil procedure, or improving thoroughly the translations 
that had already been done as well as the commentaries on those codes, 
and proposed to send expert lawyers to Germany, Austria, France,  
and Belgium to learn the civil proceedings in practice. Those important 
postulates were implemented by the Codification Committee appointed by 
a Act of 3rd June 1919, which did not limit itself to the patterns of the laws 
                                                   
25  The President of the Commission of Civil Law at the Department of Justice was Jan 
Jakub Litauer, attorney, since 1.09.1917 also a judge of the Supreme Court. See S. Car, 
Sprawozdanie z prac Komisji Prawa Cywilnego za okres od 10 marca do dnia 15 października 1917 r.  
[Report on the Works of the Commission of Civil Law from 10 March to 15 October 1917], Gazeta 
Sądowa Warszawska [Warsaw Judicial Gazette] 1917, no. 9, pp. 87-89; Główne zasady polskiej 
procedury cywilnej. Z prac Komisji przy Departamencie Sprawiedliwości. Część I [The Main 
Principles of Polish Civil Procedure. On the Work of the Commission at the Department of Justice. 
Part I], Kwartalnik Prawa Cywilnego i Handlowego [Civil and Commercial Law Quarterly] 
1917, vol 1-4, pp. 563-564; S. Gołąb, Projekty polskiej procedury cywilnej. Powstanie – uzasadnienie 
– zdania odrębne [Drafts of the Polish Civil Procedure. Origin – Reason – Dissenting Opinions], 
Kraków 1930, p. 1; S. Grodziski, Komisja Kodyfikacyjna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [The Codification 
Committee of the Second Republic of Poland], Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne [Journal of Law 
and History] 1981, vol. 1, p. 48; Górnicki, supra note 6, pp. 12-13; S. Płaza, Historia prawa  
w Polsce na tle porównawczym. Część 3 – okres międzywojenny [History of the Law in Poland 
inCcomparative Context. Part 3 – Interwar Period], Kraków 2001, p. 476; K. Pol, Poczet prawników 
polskich [The Community of Polish Lawyers], Warszawa 2000, p. 884. 
26  L. T., Procedura cywilna w przyszłym państwie polskim [Civil Procedure in the Future Poland], 
Gazeta Sądowa Warszawska [Warsaw Judicial Gazette] 1917, no. 26, pp. 289-290. 
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of the former occupying countries27, but considering academic works and 
the most important civil procedures in the Europe of that time, including 
the most recent one, the civil proceedings of the Swiss Canton of Zurich 
(1913) and the Canton of Bern (1918). The Committee was also interested  
in Italian (1865)28, Greek (1834)29, and also, though to a very limited  
extent because of its differing from the continental model, English civil 
proceedings (1873-1875)30. The comparative background of those works did 
not mean, though, that the future Code was to be based on a compilation 
principle. Quite the contrary, it was expected to be a completely new piece 
of work including the most recent achievements of procedural law 
jurisprudence.  
 The principles of the future Polish civil procedure related to the most 
important procedure institutions, in spite of technical and economic 
difficulties, were prepared during 67 Warsaw Committee meetings (from 
10th March 1917 till 30th January 1918), protocols of which were published 
in “Kwartalnik Prawa Cywilnego i Handlowego” [Civil and Commercial 
Law Quarterly] (1917)31, and later in “Kwartalnik Prawa Cywilnego  
                                                   
27  A. Stawarska-Rippel, Trzy transformacje w procedurze cywilnej w Polsce w XX wieku. 
Wzorce rozwiązań [Three Transformations in the Civil Procedure in Poland in the 29 th Century. 
Models of Solutions], Zeszyty Prawnicze [Journal of Law] 2011, vol. 11.2, p. 354. 
28  At the beginning of the 20th century the Italian Code of Civil Procedure (1865) modelled 
on the French civil procedure was considered obsolete. Therefore drafts of civil procedure 
reform started to appear: 1920 (G. Chiovenda), 1923 (L. Mortara), 1926 (F. Carnelutti), 1930 
(G. Chiovenda), 1936 (E. Redenti), 1937 (A. Solmi). All the drafts failed before Second World 
War, but they triggered a wide discussion over civil procedure in Italy. The Italian literature 
concerning civil procedure was considered to be absolutely preeminent in comparison  
to other European countries. See M. Waligórski, Proces cywilny i jego nauka we Włoszech [Civil 
Procedure and Its Knowledge in Italy], Warszawa 1937, pp. 1-7; Waligórski, supra note 18,  
pp. 26-27; Płaza, supra note 21, pp. 492-493; M. Cappelletti, J.H. Merryman, J.M. Perillo,  
The Italian Legal System, Stanford 1967, pp. 50-51. See also C. Calisse, History of Italian Law,  
vol. II, Washington 2001, pp. 791-792. 
29  The Greek Code of Civil Procedure (1834) modelled on the French civil procedure – 
work of Bavarian lawyer Georg Ludwig von Mauer, was in force until 1968. Amendments  
of this Code were modelled on the Austrian and German civil procedure. See K.D. Kerameus, 
Judicial System and Civil Procedure in Greece, [in:] T. Ansay, J. Basedov (eds), Structures of Civil 
and Procedural Law in South Eastern European Countries, Berlin 2008, p. 122. 
30  C.H. van Rhee, English Civil Procedure until the Civil Procedure Rules (1998), [in:] C.H. van 
Rhee (ed.), European Traditions in Civil Procedure, Antwerpen-Oxford 2005, pp. 146-160. 
31  Główne zasady, supra note 25, pp. 563-564. 
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i Karnego” [Civil and Criminal Law Quarterly] (1918)32. Publishing the 
Warsaw Committee resolution together with extensive commentary was  
to become the basis for a broad, national, public discussion. The results  
of the Warsaw Committee work, although called The Main Principles  
of Polish Civil Procedure, constituting a broad preparatory material for  
the main codifying works and, prepared in a very short time while war  
was still taking place, in February 1918 were sent to Franciszek Ksawery 
Fierich, the father of Polish civil procedure studies, to be presented  
to the Law and Economic Society in Cracow (the Cracow Committee)33. 
 In the light of the origin of the general science of the proceedings 
principles at that time it is worth mentioning that at the very beginnings  
of the work on Polish civil procedure (1917) it was considered necessary  
to accept and formulate the proceedings principles a priori in order  
to provide proceedings which would be rational and convenient for the 
parties and the court.  
 The proceedings principles, which were defined for the first time  
by Nikolaus Thaddäus Gönner (1801)34, especially the adversarial principle 
(Verhandlungmaxime) and inquisitorial principle (Untersuchungsmaxime) – 
which had since been complemented by the principle of the free disposition 
of the parties (Dispositionsmaxime) and by the officiality principle 
(Offizialprinzip) – created two opposite models of civil procedure in the 
theory of law: adversarial and inquisitorial. In practice neither of them was 
                                                   
32  Główne zasady polskiej procedury cywilnej. Z prac Komisji przy Departamencie 
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purely brought into being in the modern civil proceedings35. There was and 
still are inconsistently resolved problems of formulating the catalogue  
of those rules and defining them. The creator of the procedural rules 
treated them as prime rules (maxime), which, though not directly stated  
in the act, arise from the essence of a civil procedure and determine its 
structure. The effect of the first attempt to systematise and prioritise 
procedural rules by Rabam Freiherr von Canstein, who considered them  
to be the rational basis of the whole proceedings, became an object  
of criticism. The statement that was mainly questioned said that the 
fundamental proceedings principle is justice, which consists of essential 
procedural principles, especially the principle of the equal rights of parties, 
of substantive truth, and of the free appraisal of evidence. Other principles, 
such as orality, directness, publicity, the right to appeal, the rational 
structure of the law courts, according to R. Canstein, did not come from  
the principle of justice, but they defined the structure of proceedings  
for rational reasons. The principles that result from the specific structure  
of a civil litigation were, according to R. Canstein, the free initiative of the 
parties, the free disposition of the parties, and the adversarial principle36. 
Eugeniusz Waśkowski did not agree with him, mainly highlighting that 
justice is not a principle, but a postulate of civil litigation. Its realisation 
should be provided by all the constructive principles, and the most 
important requirement that a civil procedure should comply with is 
providing rightness (equitable) of judgements, their legality, and 
rationality37. According to E. Waśkowski’s concept, which was the first 
attempt to fully systemise the procedural principles in interwar Poland,  
the main principles of civil procedure arising from its essence as 
“unconditional, absolute, basic and elemental”38 were those principle  
of the free disposition of the parties, the principle of the equal rights of the 
parties, procedural formalism, and the judge’s control over the formal 
                                                   
35  M. Waligórski, Gwarancje wykrycia prawdy w procesie cywilnym [Guarantees of the 
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p. 262. 
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course of the proceedings. Those principles, which arose from the essence 
of the civil procedure did not predetermine if the case was to be oral, 
written, open, or secret, or who is to gather factual material (evidence) for 
the proceedings. The issue was quite differently presented by Franciszek 
Kruszelnicki, who classified as resulting from the essence of the civil 
procedure the following principles: the principle of accusatorial procedure, 
the principle of the right to be heard, and the principle of truth that was  
to be ensured by the principles of officiality, orality, and the direct 
examination of evidence by the judge, open proceedings, the obligation  
of the parties to tell the truth, and the free appraisal of evidence  
by the judge. Other principles were treated as dealing with the external 
structure of the proceedings39.  
 Both the Warsaw Committee and the Cracow Committee opted for 
taking into consideration the active participation of the judge in the civil 
proceedings, as corresponds with the evolution of civil procedure  
in Western Europe. In the opinion of the chairperson of the Warsaw 
Committee, Jan Jakub Litauer, “the judge should not be a machine, satisfied 
with what the parties say and present; quite on the contrary, the judge 
should play an active role in the search for the truth; he should go beyond 
the evidence presented by the parties; indeed, the judge should interfere 
when he sees the need to complete the material (…) and so the civil 
proceedings crosses the line over which it is the material truth that  
is victorious”40. In this respect he supported Franz Klein’s argument that 
the very limited activity of a judge is not in keeping with his role and  
the power of judgement if, for example, the contract is not opposed to good 
dealing and morals, if the penalty fixed by the contract is not too high,  
or if there is not a case of exploitation of the weak, etc. Therefore, the 
opinion of the chairperson were not influenced by habits (local patriotism) 
resulting from almost seventy years of French civil procedure being  
in force, and then the Russian procedure, which was to a great extent based 
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on the French one. J.J. Litauer recognised that the powers of the judge 
should be extended so that the right of the free disposition of the parties  
is retained, though the judge was to cooperate with the parties in order  
to reach the material truth. The Warsaw Committee therefore adopted  
a proposal that the civil proceedings should be based on the principles  
of open proceedings, orality with a part of written form in proceedings and 
directness (direct examination of evidence by the judge). Furthermore, civil 
procedure should be an admixture of adversarial and inquisitorial 
principles with the preservation of the principle of the free disposition  
of the parties41.  
 At the meeting of the Cracow Committee Franciszek Ksawery Fierich 
followed the opinion of the Warsaw Committee adding some important 
arguments. He considered that the inquisitorial principle was mainly 
justified by the need to create civil proceedings adequate to the Polish 
society at that time, as well as the requirements related to the concentration 
of procedural material. Gathering procedural materials, facts, and evidence 
should be an obligation of the parties. However, the judge should  
be “significantly and spontaneously” involved in that process but satisfied 
with the formal truth. The regulations of the future Code of Civil Procedure 
were to be clear and possibly wide42. F.K. Fierich was supported by Józef 
Skąpski, who declared, that independently from theoretical concepts  
of the aim of the civil proceedings, if it is discovering the truth (Josef 
Köhler), or giving the parties a chance to obtain that aim (Adolf Wach), 
such a judicial decision is appropriate which is nearest to the factual truth. 
The judge should be able to determine the truth in a correct, precise,  
and complete way, and the inquisitorial principle, which was modified  
by the necessary postulates of the private law and the resultant autonomy 
of the parties, serves that purpose43. Only Stanisław Gołąb was against 
considering the inquisitorial principle: “Today even autonomy has suffered 
a great deal, today even some civil law experts without hesitation  
and unblushingly talk about contractual compulsion”44. He also claimed 
that the far-reaching inquisitorial principle does not necessarily contribute 
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43  Ibidem, p. 19. 
44  Ibidem, p. 17. 
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to establishing the truth in the case: it may lead to delay, which has 
negative implications in relation to ethical issues.  
 The postulates regarding the principles of the first Polish Code of Civil 
Procedure were to become a part of the evolution of civil proceedings  
in Western Europe. As is well known, the first parent for all modern codes 
of civil procedures – French civil procedure (1806) perfectly well fitted  
the liberal principles of the French Civil Code. Based on the principles  
of formal equality, openness, orality, and directness, the principles  
of the free disposition of the parties, and the adversarial principle as well  
as the principle of the free appraisal of evidence, which was called “an old 
one even when it was born” (Ernest Galsson), was based on the ordinance 
of 1667, and was the least innovative piece of work of the Napoleonic era45. 
The essential novelties were mainly connected with a new organisation  
of the administration of justice based on the separation of powers  
and the independence of the judiciary, the principles of universality  
and equality46. In the legislative motives for the French civil procedure 
(1806) it was highlighted that the proceedings should be simple, quick, and 
economically advantageous47. The Code was supposed to be “free from any 
verbiage or unnecessary procedures”48. However, under the application  
of the French Code its disadvantages were quite quickly noticed. The 
inflexibility of the regulations of the Napoleonic French civil procedure  
and its over-formality predominated above the substantive aspects  
of an equitable decision. Widely considered adversarial principle, passivity 
                                                   
45  The authors of the draft of the French civil procedure (1806) were lawyers originating 
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of the judge, lengthy conclusions grossayées, led to delays in the proceedings 
increasing their costs49.  
 Those experiences as well as the increasing crisis of liberalism resulted 
in the French model being considered as insufficient, which in consequence 
led to a postulate of an active encroachment of the state into the sphere  
of civil procedure50. The civil dispute as a negative social phenomenon 
blocking part of the national wealth under on-going disputes over property 
rights required a quick and cheap civil procedure (Franz Klein)51. It was 
therefore impossible to leave the course of the proceedings solely  
to the initiative of the parties, as it was in the French model. In the result, 
the principle of adversarial procedure was no longer perceived as “battle” 
between the parties beyond any interference from a public authority.  
The overcoming of the existing French model by the Austrian civil 
procedure (1895) marked out the direction of the reforms of civil procedure 
especially in Germany, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland and the Scandinavian 
countries, Greece, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and Holland52. Activity of the 
judge, especially in the context of finding factual grounds for judicial 
decision, in spite of the general rule that presenting the evidence comes 
under the remit of the parties, is characteristic for nearly all the civil 
procedure codes in modern Europe53. France also, though quite recently 
(1975), followed that evolutionary tendency, drawing from the new ideas  
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of German and Italian jurisprudence, mainly because of two exceptional 
jurists: Henry Motulsky and Henry Vizioz54. The changes that were  
made at that time were explained by the need to introduce “the air  
of the 20th century”, so that, within the old and known frames, access  
to a judge would be less burdensome, the time of the case shorter, and  
the judge better informed55. In order to make the proceedings more 
efficient, the new French Civil Proceedings Code adopted solutions 
widening the powers of the judge (court)56. Taking that into consideration, 
the approximation of two great law families – the Romano-Germanic (civil 
law) and the common law – becomes an interesting phenomenon under  
the evolution of civil procedure. In the legal literature it was stated that  
the English reform of Lord Harry Woolf (1998) which aimed at facilitating 
the proceedings – in the light of the criticism on the traditional English  
civil justice system, especially the passive role of the judge and the 
absolute, inviolable adversarial principle – caused even an “evisceration” 
of the adversarial system57.  
 The re-evaluation of the principles of civil proceedings in the second 
half of the 19th century in connection with understanding the proceedings 
in the context of important social functions (Sozialfunktion) and the pursuit 
of the public interest (Wohlfahrtsfunktion) were accompanied by changes 
focusing on accelerating civil proceedings: “it is expedient to highlight the 
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common evil, which is prolonged proceedings, causing such a suspicious 
attitude against exercising jurisdiction”58. The principle of the restricted 
investigative power of judges complemented with their discretionary 
powers in order to concentrate on the material submitted in proceedings  
as well as restricting the still “beloved” orality principle served that 
purpose59. The implementation of the postulate to improve and accelerate 
proceedings and solve the eternal problem in developing a civil procedure 
which would respond to the postulates of reliability, justice, and 
procedural economy, and in fact solve the collision of those principles with 
an appropriate balance, has been a basic issue for civil procedure 
reformers60. 
 The principle of orality, though it was accepted as one of the main 
principles of civil proceedings in the 19th-century codes of civil procedure, 
was implemented in the practice of courts in various ways. It was explicitly 
illustrated by a loudly dispute between two German lawyers Otto Bähr and 
Adolf Wach under the applying uniform Code of Civil Procedure (1877)  
for the whole Second Reich. That dispute had finally proved that civil 
proceedings cultivating the strictly obeyed orality principle in practice 
meet a lot of obstacles61. Supporting an oral and adversarial trial with  
a solid written foundation, which O. Bähr called for, and a number  
of discretionary powers of judges, especially those enabling them to reject 
delayed statements of the parties, were to serve the so called unity  
of the hearing, which meant the possibility of adjudicating directly after the 
hearing of the evidence, according to the principle of directness, at a single 
oral hearing. The oral trial, convenient for the parties, to a greater extent 
favours finding the truth, settlements, and concentration of evidence and 
acceleration of the proceedings. It also hinders litigiousness and restricts 
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persecutions (A. Wach)62. A different approach towards the French civil 
procedure and, echoing it, the Russian and German approaches was 
reflected in the Austrian procedure (1895) where the oral trial was based  
on a wide written foundation63, as was the Hungarian as well (1911)64.  
The most modern civil proceedings of that time – in the Swiss cantons  
of Zurich (1913) and Bern (1918) emphasised the importance of writing  
at specific stages of the proceedings65. 
 The idea realised in the breakthrough Austrian Code of Civil 
Procedure was linked with the obligation to tell the truth (Wahrheitspflicht) 
resulting from the obligation to act in good faith66. The Austrian Code  
did not implement penalties for the parties either for faulty declarations  
or for the deliberate prolonging of the proceedings. Implementing such 
penalties (a fine) was proposed by F. Klein, who pointed out that effective 
control of the proceedings cannot be implemented without a fine for a lie 
and it should be introduced, even if only to consolidate that obligation  
in the consciousness of the parties. Contemporarily it has noticed that  
F. Klein’s ideas are relevant to the civil proceedings reform, even today, 
more than a century later67.  
 The influence of Austrian civil procedure (1895) on the Hungarian 
regulations was only an inspiration for developing its principles  
in the Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure (1911)68. Given the examples  
of the Austrian civil proceedings, the Hungarian Code provided for the 
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possibility of charging the costs of the delay in resolving the case to the 
party winning it, if it brought up facts and evidence in order to protract 
proceedings69. A novelty, in comparison to the Austrian regulation, was  
the possibility of imposing a penalty of a six hundred kroon fine  
on the party or their attorney for a deliberate delay or a false declaration70. 
The wide range of the judge’s control of the proceedings included  
the possibility, unrestricted by the objection of the parties, of taking 
evidence ex officio that parties invoked even if only in preparatory 
documents71.  
 The regulations of the Hungarian Code (1911) caused a lively interest 
in the authors of the first Polish Code of Civil Procedure. The Hungarian 
Code was in the opinion of the President of the Codification Committee – 
Franciszek Ksawery Fierich, one of the most innovative civil procedures  
of that time. Moreover this Code was in force over a very small area  
of Polish territory, although for a very short time – only for 13 months.  
It covered 13 Spiš villages and 12 Orava villages, on the territory  
of previous Zalitavia, which belonged to the Kingdom of Hungary till  
the end of the First World War and was then incorporated into Poland  
as a result of dividing Spiš, Orava and Cieszyn Silesia between Poland  
and Czechoslovakia by the decision of the Ambassadors Council in Paris 
on 28th July 1920.  
 The Hungarian civil procedure, as well as Swiss canton procedures, 
especially the Code of Civil Procedure of Zurich (1913) and Bern (1918) 
played a prominent role in the drafts of the first Polish Code of Civil 
Procedure72. The Code of Civil Procedure of Zurich (1913)73 was a kind  
of model for civil proceedings in the German-speaking cantons.  
It provided, similarly to the later civil procedure of Bern canton (1918)74,  
for a broad power of a judge. The aspiration to deliver a judgement  
on the basis of the real factual state and with no undue delay was reflected 
                                                   
69  § 221 Hung. PP (1911). 
70  § 222 Hung. PP (1911). 
71  § 326 Hung. PP (1911). 
72  F.K. Fierich, [in:] Komisja Kodyfikacyjna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Dział Ogólny [Codification 
Committee of the Second Republic of Poland, General Section], tome I, vol. 10, p. 274. 
73  Gesetz betreffend den Zivilprozess (Zivilprozessordnung) vom 13. April 1913 mit den 
seitherigen Änderungen, Zürich 1951. 
74  Die Zivilprozessordnung für den Kanton Bern vom 7.08.1918. 
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in both those Swiss procedures by entitling the judge to take the evidence 
ex officio in order to solve the case and complete unclear statements of the 
parties75. The civil procedures of those cantons, in order to concentrate and 
accelerate the proceedings, also showed a substantial deviation from  
the orality principle towards the written form76. Similarly to the Hungarian 
civil procedure, the Zurich civil procedure provided a penalty for 
deliberate delay of the proceedings by extensive and inessential (restating) 
in writing statements77. Concentration of the evidence and the efficiency  
of the proceedings, especially in complex cases, in the Zurich procedure 
were ensured by an original institution, the so called referendary session78. 
To achieve those aims the Zurich civil procedure also used a clause  
of abuse of procedural rights. The parties were not allowed to implement 
deliberately unjustified cases and enforce their rights through illicit means. 
The parties were obliged to tell the truth. Conducting the dispute in bad 
fight and in a litigiousness manner was punishable by a disciplinary 
penalty79. The procedure of the Swiss canton of Bern prohibited the parties 
and their representatives from deliberately distorting the truth, or unfairly 
denying and deliberately delaying the proceedings80. The specifics  
of the Swiss legal system, legal particularism caused by the wide legislative 
competences of cantons since 1815 and later preserved in the Constitution 
of 1848, made Swiss law an important subject for comparatists. Despite 
remaining in two basic impact zones of French and German-Austrian laws, 
the Swiss codes were based more on the legal acquis of cantons than on 
French or German laws81. The popular opinion of cultural independence,  
                                                   
75  § 166 Zürich. ZPO (1913); Article 214 Bern. ZPO (1918). 
76  Dymek, supra note 49, p. 556. 
77  § 154 Zürich. ZPO (1913). 
78  § 146-149 Zürich. ZPO (1913). See also Fierich, supra note 64, p. 202; W. Dymek, 
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in spite of multiculturalism and being of the influence of the neighbouring 
countries for ages82, made Switzerland a consolidation concordat democracy 
realising minority rights83. Those tendencies were sustained in the uniform 
Swiss Civil Procedure Code84.  
 The civil procedure of the Swiss canton of Bern (1918) was particularly 
interesting for the Chairman of the Codification Committee of the Second 
Republic of Poland, mainly because of its being built on the theoretical 
concept of civil proceedings as a legal relationship. The civil procedure  
of the Swiss canton of Bern (1918) directly adopted this notion  
as a statutory term (Prozessvoraussetzungen)85. This concept was also the 
underlying idea of the draft of Polish Code of Civil Procedure, which was 
from the point of view of the father of Polish civil procedure jurisprudence 
a public tripartite legal relationship.  
 In the draft of F.K. Fierich the main point, “the spine of the structure  
of civil proceedings”86 was to be an obligatory reply to the statement  
of claim, generally based on Bern civil procedure (1918)87. Interestingly, 
that construction, thoroughly prepared and then discussed at the section  
of civil proceedings of the Codification Committee of the Second Republic 
of Poland, was an inspiration for the amendment (1925) of a Romanian civil 
procedure of 186588 based originally on the Code of Civil Procedure of the 
Swiss canton of Geneva (Code Bellot, 1819), which was based on French 
civil procedure89. Polish codifying works also stressed the advantages  
of the Code of Civil Procedure of the canton of Bern, which in a hundred 
                                                   
82  K. Sójka-Zielińska, Stulecie kodeksu cywilnego szwajcarskiego [The Century of the Swiss Civil 
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and forty three introductory articles covered all the regulations of a general 
nature. The Zurich code of civil procedure on the other hand included 
section two (§ 90-108) on the general rules of proceedings (II Abschnitt. 
Grundsätze des Verfahrens im allgemeinen).  
 The draft of the first Polish Code of Civil Procedure in its general 
provisions, in the context of the judge’s control of the proceedings and his 
ability to take evidence ex officio, was treated more widely than in the 
Austrian Code and referred to the solutions of the Bern procedure90.  
The author of that part, Józef Skąpski, considered it legitimate to limit that 
possibility as in the Austrian model and introduce exceptions in the special 
regulations91. At the same time he stressed that considering the 
inquisitorial principle limiting the adversarialism requires taking into 
account the principle of the free disposition of the parties as much as 
possible (in terms of the bringing, limitation, abandoning, and withdrawal 
of an action, settlement, etc.) with the least tincture of officiality92.  
A proponent of taking into account the inquisitorial principle in a wider 
scope than J. Skąpski was J.J. Litauer, the author of the part on evidence 
(Title on evidence) in the draft of the first Polish Civil Proceedings Code93. 
It should be stressed that the original and innovative draft of J.J. Litauer 
referred in the largest number of articles to the solutions of the Bern and 
Hungarian civil procedures, which largely considered public element.  
In the remaining part the draft derived most from the Austrian civil 
procedure and least from the Russian and French ones. 
 In relation to the scope of the orality principle J. Skąpski proposed 
joining it with the written form in order to concentrate the procedural 
evidence and make an appropriate preparation for the oral hearing.  
The motions submitted before the hearing were to be in writing. Following 
the Austrian regulations he proposed that lengthy legal considerations in 
the preparatory documents were unacceptable, and the court was allowed 
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91  Ibidem, p. 172. 
92  Ibidem, p. 170. 
93  Article 10 of the draft of J.J. Litauer Title on evidence: “The Judge may order, ex officio, 
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to reject such documents except the ones for which failure to lodge them 
determines failure to comply with the time limit, which he considered  
to be too excessive for the parties. Skąpski’s draft provided, following  
the Hungarian mode as well as the Zurich one, the possibility of imposing 
a fine on the party or its representative for deficiencies in this respect94. The 
discretionary power of a judge was supposed to become the most efficient 
means to “eradicate litigious graphomania”95. Until the completion  
of the hearing the parties were allowed to present new circumstances and 
evidence. In order to concentrate the procedural evidence the court could 
(though it did not have to) ignore the statements and evidence 
consideration of which would require postponing the trial if the party 
brought them in order to delay96. Such “strongest concentration means”97 
were complemented with the possibility of imposing on the party  
an obligation to bear the costs of any delay which was caused by them,  
no matter what the outcome of the judicial procedure was98. In the opinion 
of F.K. Fierich, the example of the discretionary power of a judge that  
was formed by the French judiciary, not dealt with by any provision of the 
Code of Civil Procedure (1806), in extensive interpretation of Article 342 
and 343 of that Code, reflected the essence of that issue: that the judge is  
the natural regulator of the procedural mechanism and decides the way  
of execution and the success of applying the provisions and main principles 
of procedural law in practice99. The consequences of the proposed 
discretionary powers of a judge were supposed to be moderated by  
the possibility of taking evidence ex officio, and first of all, introducing  
the appeal cum beneficio novorum100. The system of discretionary power  
of a judge, prepared by J. Skąpski and preferred by F.K. Fierich, providing 
                                                   
94  Skąpski, supra note 79, p. 127. 
95  Ibidem, p. 149. 
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flexibility and concentrating the procedural evidence, originating from the 
Anglo-Saxon system101, during further works on the draft of the first Polish 
Code of Civil Procedure was modified, changed and finally not included  
in the Code.  
 Imposing the obligation of telling the truth on the parties was at that 
time one of the most controversial issues at the Codification Committee  
of the Second Republic of Poland. J. Skąpski supported the Hungarian and 
Swiss solutions. The parties were obliged to present in the specific terms 
the current status of the case in accordance with the truth and accordingly 
make statements. Any deficiencies in this respect, as J. Skąpski suggested, 
and according to the Zurich model, should be penalised by a fine imposed 
on the party or their representative for intentional and flagrant distortion  
of the current status, either by made up statements, invented evidence  
or unfounded denial102. Such a solution related to F. Klein’s unrealised 
postulate103, was also unrealised in the Polish Code of Civil Procedure.  
 The referees of the draft of first Polish Code of Civil Procedure  
were less interested in the provisions of the German and Russian civil 
procedures. The reforms of German civil procedure of 1924-1933 
corresponded to general trends in the changes in civil procedure. However, 
in the German doctrine of the 1930s appeared statements negating  
the existence of the right to judicial protection (right to a judicial  
decision on the merits), quite characteristic for totalitarian systems104.  
The amendment of 13th May 1924 was characterised by the tendency  
to accelerate proceedings by simplifying the forms in proceedings and 
countering procedural delay, as well as limiting the adversarial principle 
powers of a judge, which brought German and Austrian solutions closer 
together105. The limited scope of the discretionary powers of a judge 
relating to the possibility of concentrating the procedural evidence was 
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widened and strengthened106. According to the amended provisions (1933), 
the court was permitted to reject evidence and the party’s statements  
if they had not been presented previously in the preparatory procedural 
document. The amendment of 1933 introduced the obligation  
of truthfulness107. The parties were obliged to submit full and true 
explanations, whereas the court was obliged to ensure that the parties 
presented the evidence to support their statements. In Russia, on the other 
hand, the adversarial principle in the view of the Act of 1864 was supposed 
to guarantee that the courts, especially in the first few years of applying  
it, did not “get off course” onto the gathering evidence and explanations  
as in a former days108. The power of the judge in his control of the 
proceedings both before the district courts as well as the justice of the peace 
courts was just slightly widened by an amendment of 15/18 June 1912  
with effect from 1/14 January 1914109. The novelty lay in the possible 
obligation to pay a fine for negligence (delay) to the opponent, on his 
motion, by the negligent party110. By this amendment the rural courts 
(волостной суд) were reorganised and the separation between judiciary and 
administration – which was the cornerstone of the reform of 1864 and at 
that time was received with great enthusiasm – was restored111. In practice, 
before the amendment of 1912, the functioning of the rural courts for 
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peasants and the judicial power of governor of the local gentry resulted  
in judiciary and administration being still joined together.  
 In the course of further work on the draft of the first Polish Code  
of Civil Procedure, many pioneering, innovative, and original ideas and 
concepts created on the basis of a wide comparative background were  
to some extent suppressed in the Codification Committee itself, however 
further distortion appeared during ministerial works. Not taking into 
account innovative institutions by the codifiers of the first Polish Code  
of Civil Procedure was the result of trying to preserve “a golden mean”, 
which was perceived to exist, though inconsistently, in the Austrian civil 
procedure. The changes, which were implemented later, at the ministry 
stage, were characterised by approximating the regulations of the Code  
of Civil Procedure with the Russian solutions under the pressure  
of lawyers from the former Congress Kingdom of Poland – in those days 
the local patriotism appeared to be the strongest. 
  
 3. AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR  
 
 Decodification of the civil proceeding in People’s Poland (1950)112 
essentially consisted of transforming its existing principles, and mainly  
of moving away from the traditional perception of civil procedure  
as the public one (ius publicum), but at the same time focusing  
on the protection of private (civil) rights. A propaganda statement  
in Socialist doctrine about the convergence of interests of an individual  
and the state distorted the essence of the right to judicial protection  
(the right to judicial decision on the merits). In a Socialist country  
the protection could not have been given to an individual if it was not  
in accordance with peculiarly understood social (collective) interest113. 
Challenging the autonomy of the parties’ will and restricting the principle 
of the free disposition of the parties in reality meant the reconstruction  
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of the civil law much more than the procedural law114. Even Eugeniusz 
Waśkowski wrote in the first Polish system of civil procedure (1932) that 
the principle of the free disposition of the parties belongs to irrespective 
ones, and its ruthlessness consists of the fact that its breach by legislation 
would have no real importance and would be pointless from the point  
of view of the essence of the civil procedure115. In Socialist law it was 
common to marginalise the private law on behalf of the administrative and 
economic laws116. In the terms of civil procedure, according to Marx’s 
theory of a trial – that “law and a trial are so closely linked together  
as e.g. the forms of animals are linked with their body and blood, so that 
one and the same spirit has to animate the trial and the acts, as the trial  
is only a form of the act’s life, thus the indication of its internal life”117 – 
tipping the balance in favour of the principles closer to administrative 
procedure, such as the inquisitorial principle, and broadening the scope  
of non-litigious proceedings ensued. Comparing the legislative 
achievements of the Ministry of Justice in People’s Poland for 1949 it was 
written that: “non-litigious proceedings, which are favoured by post-war 
legislature, even at the expense of the customarily established scope of non-
litigious proceedings, were introduced to a large extent”118.  
 As the model for the Polish Act of 20th July 1950, in which a significant 
reform of the principles of the first Code of Civil Procedure (1930) took 
place, served Soviet law, which was stressed by the authors of this 
amendment who carried out the works within the structures of the 
Ministry of Justice119. The contents of the Act of 20th July 1950 already 
included new concepts of Soviet doctrine that were formulated in the 
context of the criticism of the first Soviet Code of Civil Procedure (1923), 
which to some extent referred to European tradition and an earlier Act on 
the civil proceedings (1864), although it also included Soviet innovations. 
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This Code in the late 30s was perceived as anachronistic, which led  
to many, often incompatible, amendments. The discrepancy between  
the first Code of Civil Procedure RSFSR and the amendments became 
deeper when the Stalin constitution (1936) and the new Act on the common 
Court System of the 16th August 1938 came into force120. 
 The first Code of Civil Procedure RSFSR (1923) provided for the 
obligation imposed on the court to attempt by any means to explain actual 
law and the mutual relationship of the people concerned121. Interestingly,  
it did not include the obligation of truthfulness, which was adopted,  
in accordance with the principle of objective truth, by the majority  
of the people’s democracies. The Soviet theorist S.N. Abramov stated that 
in the absence of a provision providing for the obligation to tell the truth,  
as it was only a moral one, it was not an obligation of the parties122. He was 
argued with by A.F. Klejnman, who derived the obligation to tell the truth 
from Article 130 of the Stalinist constitution: “that obligation of parties in 
the Soviet civil proceedings results from the basis of the Soviet Socialist 
system, in which an honest citizen should not lie to his Socialist state and 
its organ”123. In the Soviet civil proceedings the parties were obliged, 
though, to use all granted procedural rights in good faith. Any abuse in this 
matter was supposed to be immediately suspended by the court124. The 
clause on the abuse of procedural rights served the purpose of addressing 
the delay in the proceedings, which widely included the orality principle 
making it at the same time accessible for a citizen. The construction dealing 
with the abuse of procedural rights appeared in Soviet law quite early,  
in comparison to the procedural legislation of Western Europe, which 
raises associations with the codes of civil procedure in the cantons  
of Zurich (1913) and Bern (1918). Similarities, and even a statement about 
an obvious following of them in the first Soviet Code of Civil Procedure 
(1923) were noted in the Polish inter-war legal literature125, as well as in the 
                                                   
120  D.W. Chenoweth, Soviet Civil Procedure: History and Analysis, Philadelphia 1977, pp. 31-33. 
121  Article 5 RSFSR GPK (1923). 
122  С.Н. Абрамов (ed.), Гражданский процесс [Civil procedure], Мoskow 1948, p. 93. 
123  Quot. by Абрамов, supra note 122, p. 92. 
124  Article 6 RSFSR GPK (1923). 
125  Petrusewicz, supra note 80, p. 164 et seq. 
110   |   Anna Machnikowska, Anna Stawarska-Rippel 
Western literature126. Also in terms of reducing the adversarial principle 
and striving to discover the substantive truth, the Soviet provisions in the 
Code of Civil Procedure RSFSR (1923) did not differ significantly from  
the general tendency of reforming civil proceedings in Western Europe 
countries127. In accordance with the Code (1923), which contained the rule 
of repartition of the burden of proof following the Russian Act on civil 
procedure (1864), the burden of adducing the proof and proving was  
on the parties128. 
 The difference lay in the fact, that the classical coverage  
of adversarialism was in the Soviet doctrine fractured and formed in such  
a way as not to become an obstacle in the realisation of the peculiarly 
understood principle of the objective truth, corresponding with  
the assumptions of the Marxist theory of cognition, which concluded that 
the truth in the proceedings is achievable. Ipso facto the Soviet doctrine 
denied contrary of the absolute (objective) truth and a relative (formal) 
truth129. Supremacy of the objective truth principle, as supreme over other 
procedural principles, was commonly accepted in the Socialist doctrine  
of civil procedure130. 
 In terms of the principle of the free disposition of the parties, the Code 
of Civil Procedure RSFSR (1923) did not provide the possibility of deciding 
beyond the claim in the proceedings before the court of the first instance, 
except in those cases in which the size of the claim had not been earlier 
settled by the agreement of the parties or was not determined by law (a bill, 
a contract, rates)131. The withdrawal of an action was at the discretion  
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of the court in all matters132. Only the Fundamentals of Civil Procedure  
of the USSR and Union Republics (1961) and the second Code of Civil 
Procedure RSFSR (1964) emphasising – expressis verbis – collective (public) 
interest, introduced a general rule that the court was not bound by  
the limits of a claim133. The restriction of the free disposition of the parties’ 
principle in the first Code of Civil Procedure RSFSR (1923) manifested itself 
in the competences of the prosecutor, who was entitled to bring an action 
as well as join to civil lawsuit at every stage of civil proceedings, if in  
the prosecutor’s opinion the protection of the state or working class’s 
interests required such an action134.  
 The essential Socialist innovations appeared in the Soviet civil 
procedure at the time of the recodification of the Soviet law (1961-1964). 
Notably, the tasks (objectives) of civil proceedings were set, according  
to which rulings of the civil courts had to protect the Socialist economic 
system and Socialist ownership as well as the social, economic, political, 
and individual rights of citizens that were guaranteed by the USSR 
constitution, and the public interest of undertakings, institutions, 
organisations, collective cooperative farms, and other organisations. What 
is more, the civil procedure should have strengthened the Socialist rule  
of law, and educated the citizens in the spirit of Soviet law and rules,  
and ensure Socialist co-existence135. The Code of Civil Procedure RSFSR 
(1964) allowed for the possibility of participation by representatives  
of the State, public organisations, and employees (workers) in the civil 
proceedings136. The courts were to show initiative in notifying them of civil 
litigations with a social (public) element. Engaging society in civil cases 
aimed at providing the functions of law as “educator” and “protector”  
in forming a model Soviet citizen137.  
 The assumption of the work on the new (second) Polish Code of Civil 
Procedure that was started by the Codification Committee appointed  
by the decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 23rd August 
                                                   
132  The third and fourth sentence of Article 2 RSFSR GPK (1923). 
133  Article 195 RSFSR GPK (1964). 
134  Article 2 RSFSR GPK (1923). 
135  Article 2 RSFSR GPK (1964).  
136  Article 147 RSFSR GPK (1964). 
137  W.E. Butler, Soviet Law, London 1983, pp. 297-298. 
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1956138 was to start them from the very beginning, so as not to continue  
a failed and politically controlled project such as the ministerial draft  
of 1955. Zbigniew Resich, the Chairman of the Civil Division at the 
Supreme Court at that time, was appointed Chairman of the Second Unit  
to prepare the draft Code of Civil Procedure within the Civil Division  
of the Codification Committee of the People’s Republic of Poland.  
An outstanding jurist of wide interests, a member of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, co-author of International Covenants  
on Human Rights, a professor associated with Warsaw University, 
although he started his career at the Jagiellonian University, where  
he received his doctorate139, he is listed among the most prominent 
academics of the traditional Cracow school, guarding the continuity and 
stability of legal institutions140. The main referee of the draft was a judge  
of the Supreme Court, also in the inter-war period, Marian Lisiewski.  
At the inaugural session of the Codification Committee, M. Lisiewski 
bravely stated that the subjects of civil proceedings were side-lined from 
the position of the subject of the civil proceedings onto the position  
of a mere participant, who does not have a decisive influence on the 
proceedings itself. It significantly altered the aim of the civil proceedings, 
in which two equal subjects lead a dispute about the law141. The restriction 
of the party’s (an individual) rights, characteristic of the implemented 
changes, had an impact on civil procedure principles. M. Lisiewski 
expressed the need to highlight the principle of the free disposition  
of the parties and the adversarial principle more. He strongly criticised the 
prosecutor’s powers in civil proceedings, who in all instances was entitled, 
                                                   
138  About the origin, organisational structure and works proceedings of Codification 
Committee in People’s Republic of Poland see Fiedorczyk, supra note 21, pp. 285-300. 
139  Profesor Zbigniew Resich i jego działalność [Professor Zbigniew Resich and His Activity],  
[in:] M. Jędrzejewska, T. Ereciński (eds), Studia z prawa postępowania cywilnego. Księga 
pamiątkowa ku czci Zbigniewa Resicha [Studies of Civil Procedural Law. A Commemorative Book  
in Honour of Zbigniew Resich], Warszawa 1985, pp. 7-10; A. Bielecki, Zbigniew Resich 1915-1989, 
[in:] G. Bałtruszajtys (ed.), Profesorowie Wydziału Prawa i Administracji Uniwersytetu 
Warszawskiego 1808-2008 [Professors of the Faculty of Law and Administration of Warsaw 
University 1808-2008], Warszawa 2008, pp. 293-295.  
140 Sawczuk, supra note 23, p. 168. 
141  M. Lisiewski, Podstawowe problemy struktury nowego postępowania cywilnego [Primary 
Problems of the Structure of the New Civil Proceedings], Nowe Prawo [New Law] 1957, no. 3,  
p. 12.  
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not only to defend the law, but also to act as a subject bringing an action  
in all cases and gathering procedural material (evidence), which undermined 
the individual’s autonomy and also the principle of the equal rights  
of the parties. The necessity to verify and discuss again the issue of the 
participation of a prosecutor in the civil proceedings was also stressed  
in the inaugural speech for the Codification Committee of the People’s 
Republic of Poland the minister of justice Zofia Wasilkowska142. 
 The problem of principles for the future code was discussed on the 
basis of Z. Resich’s lecture entitled: “The principle of a free exercise by the 
parties of their rights and the adversarial principle in the civil proceedings 
of the People’s Republic of Poland” presented at the session, 21st February 
1957, of the Codification Committee’s Civil Procedural Law Unit143.  
The assumption of the lecture was an objective analysis and critique  
of the former legal science and practice acquis both in the capitalist as well 
as in the socialist law. Z. Resich in the first place stressed the public (social) 
role of civil proceedings and the need to seek the truth in it, which was 
linked with the problem of defining the borders of implementing that 
postulate. He justified accepting such an assumption by the general 
direction of civil proceedings evolution with reference to the drafts  
of the first Polish Code of Civil Procedure (1930). He also proposed 
including a regulation expressing the (objective) truth principle in the 
Preliminary Provisions in the General Part of the Code. He referred to the 
solutions of the Czechoslovak (1950) and Bulgarian (1952) codes, though he 
regarded their regulations as excessive.  
 The Czechoslovak Code of Civil Procedure (1950) provided that the 
court comprehensively ensures the determining of the actual status and  
by just rulings was to strengthen the “Socialist rule of law“ and educate 
citizens so that they would exercise reasonable citizenship144. The parties 
were obliged to present to the court facts to support their notions and full 
                                                   
142  Z. Wasilkowska, Zadania Komisji Kodyfikacyjnej [Tasks of the Codification Committee], 
Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 1957, no. 1, p. 9. 
143  Z. Resich, Zasada dyspozycyjności i kontradyktoryjności w procesie cywilnym PRL   
[The Principle of a Free Exercise by the Parties of Their Rights and Adversarial Principle in Civil 
Proceedings of People’s Republic of Poland], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 1957, no. 7-8,  
pp. 56-69. 
144  § 1(2) Czech. OSP (1950). 
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and true explanations145, which were completed by the possibility  
of providing evidence not presented by the parties ex officio146. “Omnipotent 
paternalism”, connected with accepting as superior the objective truth 
principle, expressed itself in the obligation of the court to provide  
the parties will all the necessary guidelines (indications) regarding 
procedural steps and advise the about legal consequences of their acts and 
omissions147. The Bulgarian Code of Civil Procedure (1952), on the other 
hand, provided that the court should actively participate in the full 
investigation and disclosure of the real rights as well as establishing  
the interrelations of the parties148. The court was to help the parties  
in exercising the actions required by the law in order to prevent damage  
to their interests caused by ignorance of the law, illiteracy, or due to other 
reasons. The court could ex officio collect evidence, and also investigate the 
evidence which had already been gathered and presented149. The Bulgarian 
Code of Civil Proceedings (1952) included, similarly to the first Soviet Code 
(1923), a provision on the abuse of procedural rights. According to it,  
the parties, and their representatives, were obliged to use the procedural 
rights in good faith and “with respect for Socialist co-existence rules”. What 
is more, the parties should have presented facts and explanations  
in accordance with the truth150. It is also worth mentioning, that the 
Bulgarian Code (1952) was exceptional owing to its strong tendencies 
towards consent judgement in civil proceedings151, which had been 
respected in accordance to the previous Bulgarian code of 1892, based  
on the French model and accepted in the Russian Act on civil proceedings 
(1864). In the literature, it was highlighted that at the time of the work  
                                                   
145  § 60 Czech. OSP (1950). 
146  § 88(2) Czech. OSP (1950). 
147  § 7 Czech. OSP (1950). 
148  Article 4 Bulg. GPK (1952). 
149  Article 129 Bulg. GPK (1952). See also Cz. Tabęcki, Dowody i dowodzenie według 
socjalistycznych procedur cywilnych [Evidences and Hearing of Evidence According to Socialistic 
Civil Procedures], Nowe Prawo [New Law] 1955, no. 7-8, p. 20. 
150  Article 3 Bulg. GPK (1952). 
151  J. Lapierre, Dążność do ugodowego załatwiania spraw w polskim postępowaniu cywilnym  
na tle prawno-porównawczym [Striving for Consent Judgment in Polish Civil Proceedings in the 
Comparative Background], Studia Cywilistyczne [Civilistic Studies] 1975, vol. XXV-XXVI,  
pp. 137-139. 
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on the Socialist Bulgarian Code of Civil Procedure there were attempts  
to sustain the old principles as far as was possible152. 
 Z. Resich did not quote the example of the Hungarian Code of Civil 
Procedure (1952), which in a way close to the traditional solutions, though 
modified following the Socialist form, provided that: “the tasks of the 
court, according to the aims of this act, include pursuing the disclosure  
of the substantial truth”153. In order to achieve that, the court ex officio was 
to take measures so that the parties correctly exercised their procedural 
rights and fulfilled their assigned procedural obligations. The court was 
obliged to provide the parties with the necessary information and instruct 
them on their procedural rights154. The previous obligation of the parties  
to carry out the proceedings in good faith, without causing deliberate 
delay, the truthfulness obligation, and inquisitorial elements in the case, 
which gave the possibility, not restricted by the parties’ objection, of taking 
ex officio evidence that the parties mentioned even if only in the preparatory 
documents155, had been strengthened in the Hungarian Socialist Code.  
The parties were obliged to exercise their procedural rights in a fair way, 
and the court could not approve of such actions as would cause delay  
in the proceedings or create obstacles to revealing the substantial truth.  
The provisions of the Hungarian Code were in this matter very widely 
elaborated in comparison to other Socialist civil procedures. The court 
imposed a fine (up to a thousand forint) on the party or their attorney who 
deliberately or as a result of a gross negligence stated the existence of a fact, 
which was not in compliance with the reality, or hid a fact, or unjustified 
submitted any evidence156. A heavy fine for actions aiming at delaying the 
trial and untrue statements by the parties contributed to the concentration 
and accelerating of the proceedings157. According to the old and sustained 
rule of the repartition of the burden of proof, the controversial facts were  
to be proved by this party which interest required to accept them as true. 
                                                   
152  A. Katzarsky, Judicial System and Civil Procedure in Bulgaria, [in:] T. Ansay,  
J. Basedow (eds), Structures of Civil and Procedural Law in South Eastern European Countries , 
Berlin 2011, pp. 113-114. 
153  § 3 pkt 1 Hung. PP (1952). 
154  § 3 pkt 1 Hung. PP (1952). 
155  § 222 and § 326 Hung. PP (1911). 
156  § 5 Hung. PP (1952). 
157  § 120 (in relation with § 5) Hung. PP (1952). 
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Furthermore, the court might have ex officio to take evidence regarded  
as purposeful158. What is more interesting, the Hungarian Socialist Code of 
Civil Procedure eliminated evidence obtained by hearing of the parties159.  
 Z. Resich proposed to adopt, in the Polish Code of Civil Procedure, not 
an obligation, but a duty of the court to provide a comprehensive 
explanation of all the important circumstances of the case and the real legal 
interrelations and rights of the parties160. Accepting, as the main one,  
the truthfulness principle, which in the Socialist civil procedure was called 
an objective one, did not prejudge how it would be fulfilled. Z. Resich 
agreed with the idea, that the adversarial principle gives a higher assurance 
of finding the truth in civil proceedings (E. Waśkowski). The court, though, 
should be allowed to settle the dispute as accurately as possible and 
activities of the court restricting the adversarial principle may serve that 
purpose. Z. Resich also pointed out, as was also noticed by inter-war 
codifiers, that it is required that the weaker party be protected in 
proceedings (F.K. Fierich) and that there is a need to protect the public 
interest from the possibility of a fictitious trial (Maurycy Allerhand161).  
Z. Resich proposed including an inquisitorial element in the civil 
proceedings, though limited so that those elements would not excessively 
dominate it, as was also pointed out by Marian Lisiewski162. He also 
referred to the views of Józef Skąpski (senior), who during the inter-war 
work of the Codification Committee of the Second Republic of Poland 
proposed introducing, in the first Code of Civil Procedure, the possibility 
of taking evidence ex officio, unless prohibited by the Code. However,  
he considered it unreasonable to preserve the competences of the court  
in such a wide scope, as in the revised (1950) Code of Civil Procedure163, 
and the draft of 1955164. Z. Resich proposed that the court might admit 
                                                   
158  § 164 Hung. PP (1952).  
159  Tabęcki, supra note 149, p. 21. 
160  Resich, supra note 143, p. 58. 
161  M. Allerhand, Podstęp w procesie [Deception in Proceedings at Law], Lwów 1907. 
162 Resich, supra note 143, p. 60. 
163  See supra note 2: “Article 236 § 1: The court may admit evidence not even requested  
by the parties. If necessary, the court may order appropriate investigations”.  
164  Article 178 of the draft of the Code of civil Procedure of Polish People’s Republic (1955): 
“The court may ex officio admit the evidence not invoked by the parties, even if the parties 
opposed such evidence, if it is necessary to properly explain the factual circumstances  
of the case. If necessary, the court orders an appropriate investigation to be conducted”. 
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evidence not presented by the parties, though within the frame of the 
factual cause of an action put forward by the plaintiff and without 
unnecessary violation of the parties’ private lives165. The provisions in such 
a form were supposed to add new content to the adversarial principle  
by accepting as a rule the initiative of parties in gathering procedural 
evidence and the obligation of the court to stimulate it and to give the right 
direction. The court activities ex officio were to be an exception.  
 Z. Resich’s proposal was in accordance with the requirement to widen 
the activities of the parties and restricting the court activities ex officio, 
following the rule vigilantibus iura sunt scripta, that appeared later in the 
doctrine (Mieczysław Sawczuk, Lászlo Névai)166. Following the proposal  
of Z. Resich, Civil Procedural Law Unit of Codification Committee decided 
to expose the adversarial principle, allowing at the same time the gathering 
of evidence ex officio, however without the restriction proposed by the  
Z. Resich. The Civil Procedural Law Unit did not decide to impose upon 
the court obligations exceeding its objective possibilities, although, it was 
assumed that withdrawing from the existing competencies of the court  
in gathering evidence ex officio would be contrary to the direction of the 
evolution of civil proceedings. In this matter, the Swiss solutions (Bern, 
Zurich), which connected the adversarial principle with inquisitorial 
elements, were brought up167. The Procedural Civil Law Unit, inaccordance 
with the referee’s postulate, adopted a general rule that the procedural 
actions of the parties must not have been inconsistent with the “principles 
of social life”, which was strengthened by the obligation to tell the truth.  
In this way it was intended to harmonise the obligation dealing with  
legal actions in accordance with the “principles of social life” on the basis  
of substantive law with procedural law.  
 In the terms of the principle of the free disposition of the parties,  
Z. Resich agreed with M. Lisiewski that the right of a prosecutor and other 
                                                   
165 Resich, supra note 143, p. 64. 
166  Z. Resich, Ocena założeń kodyfikacyjnych kodeksu postępowania cywilnego  [Appraisal  
of Codification Assumptions of the Code of Civil Procedure], [in:] Funkcjonowanie kodeksu 
postępowania cywilnego w praktyce [The Functioning of the Code of Civil Procedure in Practice], 
Warszawa-Popowo 1984, pp. 16-17. 
167  W. Siedlecki, Projekt kodeksu postępowania cywilnego PRL [Draft of the Code of Civil 
Procedure of the People’s Republic of Poland], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 1960, no. 3,  
p. 452. 
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subjects to bring an action is excessive. He generally opposed creating  
the possibility of the court interfering with the private lives of individuals. 
The prosecutor’s rights were to be kept within proper limits. He suggested 
that the court should inform a prosecutor about the pending case, when  
it deems his participation as necessary – especially, when there is a fear that 
the trial is fictitious or as a result of unfair defence the interest of the party, 
the third party or the general public might have been affected168. According 
to this postulate the Civil Procedural Law Unit assumed that the prosecutor 
would be allowed to participate in any pending lawsuit, introducing  
at the same time as a precondition for their action the “protection  
of legality”, and not, as had been the case, the “interests of the People’s 
Democracy State”. It was decided, as with the Czechoslovak Code (1950), 
that the prosecutor should be entitled to take actions leading to initiate  
the proceedings only in cases defined by the act. The Polish draft provided 
for such a possibility only in cases concerning nullification of marriage and 
incapacitation.  
 According to the Czechoslovak Code (1950) civil proceedings were 
initiated when requested by the participant (účastník – a notion accepted 
uniformly in the Code instead of “a party”, which reflected an ideological 
sense of bringing together litigious and non-litigious proceedings)169  
or ex officio by the prosecutor when deemed necessary in order to protect 
the state or the “interests of the working people”. The prosecutor was not, 
though, entitled to bring an action in all civil cases, but only in those 
specifically listed in the provisions of law. Prosecutor could also, at any 
stage, join the proceedings ongoing on the initiative of the parties, 
exercising their rights170. “The state interest” and “the interests of the 
working people”, as guidelines for the actions of the prosecutor on  
the grounds of civil proceedings, corresponded to a hypertrophy of general 
clauses which was characteristic of Socialist law. In the Bulgarian  
Code (1952) the prosecutor’s entitlements were wider than those in the 
                                                   
168  Resich, supra note 143, s. 66. 
169  Z. Nový, Občanské právo procesní [Civil Procedure], [in:] M. Bobek, P. Molek,  
V. Šimíček (eds), Komunistické právo v Československu. Kapitoly z dějin bezpráví [Communist Law 
in Czechoslovakia. Chapters From the History of Injustice], Brno 2009, p. 523. 
170  § 6 and § 41 Czech. OSP (1950). 
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Czechoslovak Code of Civil Procedure (1950)171. The prosecutor was 
entitled to initiate actions and exercise the rights of the parties in the civil 
proceedings, not only in the cases clearly prescribed by law, but also when 
their actions were taken in order to protect substantial (vital) national and 
public interest. Besides, the prosecutor draws up conclusions with regard 
to civil cases expressly provided by law or when he deems it necessary172. 
The court informed the prosecutor, when his participation was found in the 
particular case to be necessary173. Approval of the agreement in court, 
when a prosecutor participated in the proceedings as one of the parties, 
followed the hearing of their opinion174. The Hungarian Code (1952) 
provided that the court proceeds to hear the civil litigation only on the 
basis of a motion (statement of claim) submitted by one of the parties. 
However, in order to protect the state and the workers’ interests, such 
motion might have been submitted by the prosecutor who could also join 
the proceedings at any its stage, which made the principle of free 
disposition of the parties illusionary175.  
 Zbigniew Resich questioned the validity of the concept of the total 
autonomy of the parties in the proceedings. He claimed that adjudicating  
in accordance with the truth has to be connected with the court’s control 
over the dispositive actions of the parties. In his view, the authority  
of the court did not allow illegal actions to be taken with its approval.  
He proposed making court control possible, not obligatory, as it was in  
the draft of 1955, over the dispositive actions of the parties in terms of suit 
withdrawal, abandoning the claim, change of the claim, and agreement  
in court, which might have been done owing to a mistake, threat,  
or exploitation, but also in order to restrict the possibility of procedural 
fiction. As for the other actions, he regarded the obligation to take them  
                                                   
171  Article 2 Bulg. GPK (1952). 
172  Article 27 Bulg. GPK (1952). 
173  Article 28 Bulg. GPK (1952). 
174  Article 125 Bulg. GPK (1952). 
175  § 2 Hung. PP (1952). See Varga, supra note 68, pp. 279-280; M. Kengyel, G. Czoboly, 
Battle Between Individual Rights and Public Interest in Hungarian Civil Procedure , [in:]  
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in accordance with the “principles of social life” as a sufficient one176. 
Restricting the control over the parties’ disposition over their substantive 
rights only to some claims, as it was in the revised (1950)177 first Polish 
Code of Civil Procedure (1930), he believed to be unjustified also in the 
context of the equality of the parties’ in the proceedings178.  
 In the matter of the ability to decide beyond the request, Z. Resich 
believed that the court should have such ability in special cases; however,  
it should not change the ground of an action. This possibility should  
also not be limited to some “favoured” claims. He proposed to accept  
the provision in the following formulation: “the court may, depending  
on the circumstances of the case, go beyond the borders of the request 
presented in the action”179. Although the assumption for the draft was  
to continue the efforts to achieve real equality of the parties in the 
proceedings, Z. Resich’s proposal was not accepted.  
 In the Czechoslovak Code of Civil Procedure (1950) the court 
evaluated the dispositive actions of the parties: acknowledging the claim, 
abandoning the claim, and agreement in court, from the lawfulness and 
public interest point of view180. The second Czechoslovak Code of Civil 
Procedure (1963) introduced the possibility of derogation from the rule ne 
eat ultra petita partium in the proceedings before the first instance. The court, 
deciding, might have gone beyond the boundaries of the party’s request 
and adjudge something different (něco jiného) or more than it was 
demanded, but only when the regulations of law provided for such a way 
of regulating the relationship between the participants181. The Bulgarian 
Code (1952) and the Hungarian Code (1952) did not provide the possibility 
                                                   
176 Resich, supra note 143, pp. 67-69. 
177  Supra note 2, Article 329: “The court has neither the right to decide on the issues,  
which were not the subject of the claim nor to decide beyond the claim. The provision 
preceding the paragraph does not apply: 1) when the plaintiff is the State Treasury or any 
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178 Resich, supra note 166, p. 17. 
179 Resich, supra note 143, pp. 66-67. 
180  § 76 Czech. OSP (1950). 
181  § 153 Czech. OSR (1963). See also E. Wengerek, Orzeczenia sądowe w procedurach 
socjalistycznych [Judicial Decisions in Socialist Civil Proceedings], Studia Cywilistyczne [Civilistic 
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of adjudicating beyond the claim. The Hungarian Code provided that  
the court was bound by the parties’ statements and demands, however, 
renunciation of rights, which was contradictory to the legitimate interests 
of the party, should not have been accepted by the court, even in the case 
when the party insisted on such renunciation182. The Soviet decomposition 
of the principle ne eat iudex ultra petita partium, fully implemented in the 
second Soviet Code of Civil Procedure (1964), was followed in a weaker 
form only in the Polish civil proceedings183. 
 
 4. FINAL REMARKS  
 
 The history of codifying civil procedural law in Poland, not only, 
though, if one takes into consideration the history of Franz Klein’s draft  
in Austria, presents the phenomenon of a deviation from the assumptions 
and concepts which were a result of long-term work by experts. Such 
deviation was usually adverse.  
 During the interwar period in Poland many pioneering, innovative, 
and original ideas and concepts created by authors of the drafts of the first 
Polish Code of Civil Procedure on the basis of a wide comparative 
background were suppressed. Those ideas, which were innovative  
and pioneering in the Polish doctrine of procedural law, dealt mainly with 
the pre-trial proceedings, the abuse of the procedural rights clause,  
the obligation to tell the truth, the discretionary power of a judge, the rules 
of evidence proceedings, as well as the construction of an obligatory reply 
to the statement of claim and default judgment. The necessity of making 
the civil procedure more flexible as well as making their forms more simple 
and the amount of regulation more reasonable so that the procedural 
institutions did not become an inexhaustible source of doubts in theory  
and practice, along with various other problems discussed within  
the framework of the civil procedural law by the Codification Committee  
of the Second Republic of Poland are discussed to this day. 
 Likewise in the People’s Republic of Poland the main thrust  
of the draft (1960) of the second Polish Code of Civil Procedure was 
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crushed. In this draft the institution of prosecutor was dismantled  
as a supreme control factor and the possibility of bringing by him a legal 
action was limited to a number of cases which were strictly defined in the 
law. This draft accepting the rule of the parties’ initiative in gathering 
evidence together with obliging the court to boost it, and showing the right 
directions. In this draft a mechanical consolidation of litigious and  
non-litigious proceedings was abandoned, the appellate element was 
included to a greater extent and supervision over final judgements was de-
politicised. This draft was later perceived as “too innovative” and changed 
in accordance with the political principles of that time. 
 Certainly the causes of that phenomenon – deviation from the 
assumptions and concepts of experts, are various. In such a context it seems 
justified to express concern for the solutions of the new (third) Polish  
Code of Civil Procedure to be of such high quality that they would not be 
devalued under the influence of ad hoc impulses in the course of legislative 
procedure184.  
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE  
Anna Machnikowska 
 
 1. THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF 1930185 
  
 The first Polish Code of Civil Procedure, adopted on 29 November 
1930186, has been widely considered to be an extremely valuable 
achievement in Polish legal thinking187. Particular attention should  
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be focused on the conceptual and legislative works preceding its 
enactment, which were characterised by a careful and up-to-date analysis 
of procedural solutions applied in Europe, as well as the substantive 
discussions that took place in the Codification Committee and among  
the representatives of the legal professions. Another interesting issue is  
the model of the principles of civil procedure (which was finally 
implemented and partly corrected by the Ministry of Justice) as well as its 
functioning in practice. The authors of the Code used their personal 
experience of the legal systems of the three countries that had occupied 
Poland as well as their extensive knowledge of the practical application  
of the procedural rules and principles in other countries. In order to do so 
they asked themselves fundamental questions that were of a constitutional 
and procedural nature. Where should the boundaries between what  
is private and what is public be established? How far could the principles 
of civil procedure stimulate the development of socio-legal relations? 
Which of the then legislative trends would prove to be lasting? What did 
the principle of the judge’s control over civil proceedings and his/her 
discretionary power mean? Should the fast pace of the proceedings be  
a procedural priority? At the same time, they wanted to fulfil ambitions  
to propose their own solutions that would be worthy of the Second Polish 
Republic, the state, which after regaining independence was to create  
a legal system respecting citizens’ rights while ensuring the efficiency  
and security of modern legal transactions.  
 The Code of 1930, which entered into force in 1933, achieved their 
goals to a wide extend. It respected the autonomy of the individual  
in the sphere of civil law relations with their integral part that was  
the protection of individual rights before the courts. This was guaranteed 
by the fundamental principles of the civil process188: the adversarial 
                                                                                                                           
as well as the original solutions, see: Lubiński, supra note 12, pp. 347-364; Stawarska-Rippel, 
supra note 4, pp. 23-27, 110-156; Stawarska-Rippel, supra note 27, pp. 353-362; Polkowski, 
supra note 12; P. Rylski, K. Weitz, Wpływ rosyjskiej ustawy postępowania cywilnego z 1864 r. na 
polskie postępowanie cywilne [The Influence of the Russian Law on Civil Procedure of 1864 on Polish 
Civil Proceedings], Polski Proces Cywilny [Polish Civil Procedure] 2015, no. 2, p. 164. 
188  In the jurisprudence of the Second Republic of Poland, the issue of the content and rank 
of the principles of civil process were the subject of disagreements. Two classifications were 
proposed in this respect: Kruszelnicki, supra note 39, p. 470 and E. Waśkowski, System 
procesu cywilnego. Wstęp teoretyczny. Zasady racjonalnego ustroju sądów i procesu cywilnego  
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principle, the principle of a free exercise by the parties of their rights 
(dispositive principle), the principle of the equal rights of the parties,  
the principle of two instances, and the principle of procedural formalism. 
They were supported by the principle of the judge’s control over  
the proceedings, the principle of immediacy, the principle of oral 
proceedings, the principle of open proceedings, the principle of the free 
appraisal of evidence, and the principle of concentration of material 
submitted in court proceedings189. The first two of these principles were not 
unconditional, taking into account the social function of civil procedure, 
and the adversarial principle was partly connected to the principle obliging 
a court to search for evidence not presented by the parties (the principle  
of instructionality). Reciprocal links between these principles, which 
counterbalanced the activity of the parties and the judge, took into account 
the perspective of the entire Code. For the purposes of the Polish system  
of civil procedure the adversarial and dispositive principles were 
associated with the inquisitorial principle. The judge became responsible 
for the proper coexistence of these principles and for reliable judicial decisions 
made within a reasonable time, which also required the organisational 
efficiency of proceedings. The determination of the substantive truth  
was supported by the principle of instructionality – the substantive 
management of the process, as the Code emphasised the judge’s duty  
to determine the facts in a comprehensive manner (Article 234) and to assess 
the reliability and power of evidences, also on the basis of a comprehensive 
consideration (Article 257). 
 Code structures alluded in their form to some procedural solutions  
of the process implemented in countries like Germany (1877), Austria 
(1895), and France (1806), as well as Russia (1864)190. However, the legal 
                                                                                                                           
[The System of Civil Law. Theoretical Introduction. The Principles of the Rational System of Courts 
and Civil Process], vol. I, Wilno 1932, p. 104.  
189  The principle of concentration of material submitted in court proceedings is one of  
the principles of Polish civil procedural law which aims at counteracting the lengthening  
of proceedings by providing time limits for collecting procedural material such as facts  
or evidences. 
190  About debates in the Codification Commission on the adversarial model and an 
investigative element in the civil process, see: A. Stawarska-Rippel, Kontradyktoryjność  
i inkwizycyjność w europejskim procesie cywilnym XIX i XX w. [Adversarial and Inquisitional 
Principles in the European Civil Process in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries], Czasopismo 
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provisions adopted in 1930 in Poland were not a simple compilation  
of those structures, but an original procedural assumption. It also took into 
account the then socio-economic circumstances and the characteristic 
features of the Polish legal system, as well as a critical analysis of legal 
regulations in other countries. Such a point of view resulted in the 
implementation of procedural structures among others which included 
partial restrictions on the procedural autonomy of the parties. These 
measures formed part of the requirements of comparative law, then 
intensively developing in Europe191. They were similar to the Austrian 
solutions but they maintained the essence of the civil procedural law 
derived from French legislation. In addition to doctrinal reasons, practical 
reasons were also decisive, including the fear of protracted proceedings. 
The original consistency of the Code was partially reduced by the 
amendments introduced to the Codification Committee’s proposal by the 
representatives of the Ministry of Justice192. There was still the division  
of litigious and non-litigious proceedings and although non-litigious 
proceedings remained outside the Code, its codification was also planned 
in the course of the following legislative procedure. 
 The principles of the first Polish Code of Civil Procedure were  
indeed editorially dispersed, but functionally they remained in a strong 
relationship. The first part of the Code regulated the presumption  
of the jurisdiction of the common courts and confirmed the right of every 
person to judicial protection, including preventive protection. In many 
provisions, the notion of dispute was emphasised. The Code allowed courts 
to take evidence ex officio, unless the parties refused their consent  
or it concerned evidence from documents, the testimony of witnesses,  
and the hearing of the parties (Articles 250, 273, 289, 330). The courts’ right 
was additionally limited by the obligation to indicate the source from 
which they got to know about the evidence that could be only  
the statements of the parties or the files of the case. Consequently, this kind 
of judicial activity did not limit significantly the adversarial principle.  
The dispositive actions of the parties were not subject to judicial review. 
                                                                                                                           
Prawno-Historyczne [Journal of Law and History] 2013, vol. 2, p. 127; Stawarska-Rippel, 
supra note 187, pp. 358-360. 
191  See: Lubiński, supra note 187, pp. 351-352, 358-359. 
192  See: Stawarska-Rippel, supra note 187, pp. 106-107. 
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The withdrawal of the claim, if it took place after the start of the trial,  
was subject to the consent of the defendant, unless it was connected with 
the waiver of the claim (Article 219). The adversarial and dispositive 
principles were strengthened by the fact that courts were bound by  
the request presented in the lawsuit – the court did not have the right to 
adjudicate on issues which were not presented in the request or to decide 
over the request (Article 349). Also the examination of the case by the court 
of the second instance was limited to the scope of the appellate complaint 
(Article 415), which could take into account only the invalidity of the 
proceedings or the failure to recognise the essence of the issue by the court 
of the first instance.  
 Solutions relating to the principle of the concentration of the material 
submitted in court proceedings limited the capacity of the parties to act  
to a moderate extent. According to the Code, preparatory documents 
should be characterised by a concise and substantive content, indicating  
the relevant evidence or making reference to the allegations and evidence 
of the opposing party. However, there were no provisions concerning  
the preclusion of evidence in proceedings before the court of first instance. 
The parties could present facts and evidences till the end of the hearing 
(Article 238 § 1). The adverse effects in the form of the reimbursement  
of expenses (Article 104) or the rejection of evidence were provided for  
in cases of stalling for time or failing to respect regulations and court 
decisions. In judicial practice more importance was accorded to the court’s 
right, formulated in a categorical form, to reject evidence also if disputable 
circumstances had been “sufficiently explained” (Article 238 § 2). The wrong 
interpretation of this provision sometimes led to situations in which courts 
refused to take evidence only from one of the parties. 
 The statement of defence was optional. The obligation of the defendant 
to submit a reply or the obligation of both parties to exchange other 
documents with the determination of their date, could only arise on the 
basis of an order issued by the president of an adjudicating panel  
in “complicated and accounting” matters (Article 229). The president could 
also issue other orders of a preparatory nature. These and other measures, 
taken also at the hearing, aimed to prevent the lengthiness of proceedings 
and the fragmentation of the substance of the claim. Courts “should strive” 
for a comprehensive explanation of contentious issues at the hearing, and 
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“if possible” should close the hearing at the first court session “without 
adjournment” (Article 234). The practice proved that the solutions provided 
by the Code which concerned the preparatory stage of the process did  
not significantly accelerate the proceedings. While referring to this fact, 
some representatives of legal doctrine signalled the need to introduce  
a mandatory response to the lawsuit.  
 In the proceedings before the court of second instance it was possible 
“if necessary” to present new facts and evidence in the appellate complaint. 
However, they could be omitted if the court considered that they should 
have been presented earlier, before the court of first instance, except that  
if it was possible later or previously it was not necessary. This solution 
could be also applied to new facts and evidence presented directly at the 
hearing (Article 411). 
 A legal remedy that could be lodged with the court of second instance 
was an appellate complaint that could concern every ruling. The Code did 
not regulate the basis of the complaint, but only concisely formulated its 
content. The court of second instance heard the case and substantively 
repealed, modified, or maintained the decision of the court of first instance. 
Against judgments ending the proceedings, the parties could lodge  
a cassation complaint, with the exception of cases with a low value of the 
subject of dispute and cases concerning the infringement of possession. 
According to the Code, the cassation complaint could be based on the 
misinterpretation or misapplication of substantive law or the violation  
of the essential procedural principles under the condition that it could 
significantly influence the outcome of the case. The cassation appeal was 
recognised by the Supreme Court, which was also bound by its scope.  
The Supreme Court ex officio took into account the violation of the relevant 
procedural principles as well as the public policy criterion (Article 441). 
Apart from judgements of a cassation nature, the Supreme Court could also 
issue substantive judgements if it found a violation of substantive law. 
 Finally, those provisions of the Code which were intended to work  
out a settlement must be mentioned, including the inducement of the 
parties to reconciliation (Article 246) and the possibility of reconciliation  
of the parties before a county court before bringing a court action  
(Article 399). 
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 The several years of application of the Code of Civil Procedure 
coincided with the slow pace of recognising some cases, which was  
not caused by procedural reasons. However, this problem dominated  
in the discussion on the assessment of principles adopted in 1930. In the 
course of the discussion there was a collision outlined between  
the proposed methods aimed at expediting judicial proceedings and the 
need to establish measures that would guarantee the correct substantive 
content of the final judicial decisions. The pace of litigation began  
to be regarded as a synonym of efficiency and an element of the 
interpretation of discretionary power of the judge. There also appeared  
the question of whether expediting the procedure or blocking the parties’ 
opportunity to delay the proceedings could become one of the objectives. 
Above all, the notion of fast litigation became an argument that  
was socially and politically very popular193. Some lawyers claimed that  
the situation primarily required the correction of principles concerning  
the appeal proceedings and the collegial way of the recognition of cases  
in the first instance as well as provisions relating to the principle  
of concentration194. The systematic changes were not implemented, but on 
21 November 1938 a decree was issued on the streamlining of litigation195. 
A year earlier, in the Ministry of Justice a new office was established which 
was responsible for monitoring the substantive and technical level  
of judges’ work, subject to the limits of their statutory independence196.  
 
 2. THE PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN THE YEARS 1944-1964 
 
 In the case of Poland, the end of World War II was not only connected 
with the end of the German occupation, which brought human, economic, 
                                                   
193  T. Cyprian, Sąd apelacyjny jako instancja kasacyjna karna [The Court of Appeal as a Criminal 
Cassation Instance], Gazeta Sądowa [Judicial Gazette] 1938, no. 4, p. 754.  
194  Critical opinions on the efficiency of the judiciary in the Second Republic were not 
uniform with respect to methods of improving the situation. Some lawyers urged for the 
reform of, among others, the instance system and the rule of providing explanatory notes  
to judgments while others signaled a need for the better application of existing legislation; 
see: A. Machnikowska, Zjazdy prawników polskich [Conferences of Polish Lawyers], Palestra  
[The Bar] 2005, no. 5-6, pp. 172-180.  
195  Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 89, item 609.  
196  The Regulation of the Minister of Justice of 31.07.1937, Official Journal of the Ministry  
of Justice 1937, No. 8. 
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and cultural loss incomparable with the situation in any other European 
country, but also with a fundamental change in the political system. The 
latter resulted from the extension of the zone influenced by the Soviet 
Union over the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Under the banner 
of people’s democracy, these countries gradually began to introduce legal 
solutions which were typical of a totalitarian state, economically and 
ideologically subordinated to the interests of the authorities of the Soviet 
Union. In Poland, this process required significant legislative changes, 
which were implemented at very different paces and in very different 
forms, not always adequately to other transformations and official 
information given to the public. 
 The above mentioned circumstances also decided on the fate of the 
Code of Civil Procedure of 1930. Initially, in the years 1944-1948, the Code 
was stable because of organisational reasons and tactics of the new Polish 
government. Moreover, the process of the consolidation of substantive and 
formal civil law was completed and it extended the scope of the Code’s 
application197. Also the non-litigious proceedings were extended through 
its codification198 and the inclusion of the further types of cases. In order  
to do it, the draft law developed in the Second Republic were used199.  
The Code of Civil Procedure underwent at that time only slight 
amendments that did not concern the procedural principles200. At the same 
time, however, the new authorities excluded important areas of civil law 
                                                   
197  Decree of 25.09.1945, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 48, item 271; decrees of 21.05.1946 and 
of 8.11.1946, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 6, item 53; No. 22, item 140; No. 57, item 321; No. 60, 
item 329; No. 63, item 345 and item 346. 
198  Decree of 18.07.1945 Code of non-litigious procedure, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 27, 
item 169; and decree of 8.11.1946 on non-litigious procedure in the field of property law, 
Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 63, item 345.  
199  See more: S. Grodziski, Prace nad kodyfikacją i unifikacją polskiego prawa prywatnego (1919-
1947) [The Work on the Codification and Consolidation of Polish Private Law (1919-1947)], 
Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego [The Private Law Quarterly] 1992, vol. I, pp. 22-24;  
A. Lityński, Spór o postępowanie niesporne (1945-1964) [The Dispute over Non-Litigious 
Proceedings (1945-1964)], Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica 2003, vol. 1, p. 53. 
200  Decree of 22.10.1947 on the amendment of some provisions of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 65, item 391; decree of 29.09.1948 on the amendment 
of the implementing provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws]  
No. 44, item 314; law of 27.04.1949 on the amendment of some provisions of the Code  
on Civil Procedure, bankruptcy law, and the provisions implementing matrimonial property 
law, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 32, item 240.  
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relations from the jurisdiction of courts and delegated them to the 
competence of administrative and quasi-judicial authorities201 applying  
ad hoc procedures not regulated by the Code. It mainly concerned  
the ownership transformations, which were carried out on a large scale,  
but also were loosely associated with other civil cases202. Along with  
the acquisition of the entire political power in the country by the 
communist regime, the guarantees of the independence of judges and 
courts were suspended. These decisions were initially presented  
as improvement actions necessary during the transition period. In fact, they 
were a part of consistently implemented concept of a fundamental change 
in the legal system, which included not only the repeal of most of the legal 
acts adopted in the Second Republic of Poland, including the Code of Civil 
Procedure203, but also their replacement by the legislation that in relations 
between an individual and the state always gave the absolute primacy  
to the latter. 
 The upcoming changes were first mentioned in the statements  
of the representatives of the Ministry of Justice, who were persuading  
to merge the litigious and non-litigious modes of proceedings in a way 
which assumed that the principle of non-litigious proceedings would 
become the essential elements of the whole civil procedure. This was 
justified by the need to strengthen the rights of the economically weaker 
parties204. In fact, as was not said then, it was a prelude to the dissemination 
                                                   
201  See more: A. Machnikowska, Wymiar sprawiedliwości w Polsce w latach 1944-1950  
[The Judiciary in Poland in the Years 1944-1950], Gdańsk 2008, pp. 371-394, 462-480. See also:  
A. Mączyński, Dawne i nowe instytucje polskiego prawa mieszkaniowego [Old and New Institutions 
of Polish Housing Law], Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego [The Private Law Quarterly] 2002,  
vol. 1, pp. 69-74. 
202  See more: A. Machnikowska, Prawo własności w Polsce w latach 1944-1981. Studium 
historycznoprawne [Property Law in Poland in the Years 1944-1981. Historical and Legal Study], 
Gdańsk 2010, pp. 163-284. 
203 Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości, Prezentacja Kodeksu postępowania nieprocesowego jako 
kierunku zasadniczych zmian w całym systemie prawa procesowego. Warszawa 16-17.11.1946  
[The presentation of the Code of the non-litigious proceedings as the direction of changes in the entire 
system of procedural law. Warsaw 16-17.11.1946], Demokratyczny Przegląd Prawniczy 
[Democratic Legal Review] 1947, no. 4.  
204 The criticism of dispositive principle, which was described as the excessive freedom  
of parties in civil law relations that deformed the judiciary – see: W. Siedlecki, Istota procesu 
cywilnego z punktu widzenia interesów Państwa i jednostki [The Essence of the Civil Process From 
the Point of View of the State and an Individual], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 1947, no. 7-8. 
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of principles promoted in the Soviet doctrine of procedural civil law: the 
inquiry principle, ex officio principle and the principles of objective truth  
as interpreted by Marxist ideology. The officials also pushed for the 
introduction of a new model of instance and non-instance control involving 
a revision and an extraordinary revision, while reducing the organisation 
of common courts based on instances. An argument presented in this 
matter was to accelerate the course of proceedings. In reality, this solution 
was supposed to guarantee a permanent political control over case-law.  
A vast majority of the representatives of jurisprudence and judicature  
did not support these proposals, pointing out that they would not facilitate 
the proceedings, which required other reforms205, but they would reduce 
the level of judicial protection of individual rights. 
 However, the changes were inevitable due to the geopolitical situation 
of Poland. Economic transformations that aimed to complete the elimination 
of private property, which was the negation of the classical principles  
of civil law, were accelerated. In 1949 a state commercial arbitration206 
began to work, which was dominated by principles based on the Soviet 
model: the principle of inquiry, the principle of taking actions ex officio and 
the principle of written proceedings. The authorities widely began to refer 
to new ideological concepts. This resulted in the relativisation of the 
autonomy of civil law entities, the redefinition of the principle of the formal 
equality of the parties in the court proceedings and the justification  
of the extension of the procedural rights of judges and prosecutors, 
including the right to the teleological interpretation of legal provisions and 
also those coming from the people’s legislator207. At that point, the source 
                                                   
205  See: W. Miszewski, Druga instancja merytoryczna w procesie cywilnym [The Second 
Substantive Instance in the Civil Process], Demokratyczny Przegląd Prawniczy [Democratic 
Legal Review] 1947, no. 4; S. Garlicki, Dwuinstancyjność w procesie cywilnym [Two Instances  
in the Civil Process], Demokratyczny Przegląd Prawniczy [Democratic Legal Review] 1947,  
no. 6. 
206  Decree of 5.08.1949, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 46, item 340. See more: T. Mróz,  
O państwowym arbitrażu gospodarczym i jego funkcjach w PRL [On the State Economic Arbitration 
and its Functions in the Polish People’s Republic], Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica 2005, vol. 5. 
207  The objection against taking over the duties assigned to legislative power by judges 
were expressed by, among others: K. Grzybowski, Ustrój Polski współczesnej 1944-1948  
[The Constitutional System of the Contemporary Poland], Kraków 1948, vol. I, p. 121 and  
J.J. Litauer, O metodzie wypełniania luk w ustawodawstwie [On the Method of Filling Gaps  
in Legislation], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 1947, no. 7-8.  
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of the latter postulate is worth mentioning. It was connected not only with 
instrumentation and legal nihilism. At that time in the Soviet Union,  
the Code of Civil Procedure of 1923 was in force which did not contain  
as many elements of the socialist legal doctrine as it was claimed  
by the propaganda208. Soviet legal concepts were then created by giving 
new meanings to traditional legal concepts. For example, the adversarial 
principle began to be defined as the increased activity of the judge acting  
in the consolidated proceedings which did not much differ from  
the criminal proceedings209. These structures, however, still did not fully 
meet the criteria for a new standard of proceedings. It appeared much 
easier to use current political methods to interpret old and new legal 
provisions. 
 It was not an obstacle to the re-evaluation of legal principles in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in which full economic 
subordination to the USSR and the mono-party system were introduced. 
One of the consequences was the entry into force of a new codification of 
civil proceedings in Bulgaria (1952), Czechoslovakia (1950), and Hungary 
(1952) or, as in case of Romania and East Germany, the introduction of far-
reaching modifications of the existing legislation210. In Poland, however, 
the change was made on a piecemeal basis. While planning a new 
codification, the authorities carried out a partial decodification by amending 
the existing regulations in the years 1950-1954211. It covered the extension  
of some solutions of non-litigious proceedings to litigation and the granting 
                                                   
208  For more about the roots of the Soviet concept of civil law see: A. Bosiacki, Utopia. 
Władza. Prawo. Doktryny i koncepcje prawne bolszewickiej Rosji 1917-1921 [Utopia. Power. Law. 
Doctrines and Legal Concepts of Bolshevik Russia 1917-1921], Warszawa 2012, pp. 289-330. About 
the Soviet civil procedure see: A. Lityński, Prawo Rosji i ZSRR 1917-1991 czyli historia 
wszechzwiązkowego komunistycznego prawa (bolszewików). Krótki kurs [The Law of Russia and 
USSR 1917-1991, so on the History of All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Law. A Short Course], 
Warszawa 2012, pp. 276-289. 
209 One of the examples is: A.J. Wyszyński, Teoria dowodów sądowych w prawie radzieckim 
[The Theory of Court Evidences in Soviet Law], Warszawa 1949, p. 290.  
210  See: Stawarska-Rippel, supra note 189, p. 140.  
211  Law of 20.07.1950 on the amendment of some provisions of the proceedings in civil law 
cases, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 38, item 349; consolidated text: Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] 
No. 43, item 394; decree of 23.04.1953 on the amendment of some provisions on the 
proceeding in civil law cases, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 23, item 90; decree of 2.06.1954  
on the legal representation of authorities, offices, institutions and state enterprises before 
courts, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 25, item 93. 
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of new powers to the adjudicating panel, such as the right to increase  
the range of evidence that can be taken ex officio and to introduce  
the possibility of adjudication over the request in some cases. A particular 
commitment of the judge was required in cases involving the State 
Treasury, the organisational units of which were deprived of the previous 
legal representation of the General Prosecutor’s Office. A prosecutor 
obtained the right to freely accede to the case or to bring an action  
in any case. In this respect, reference was made to a new institution  
of the “prosecutor’s general supervision”212 which legitimised prosecutors 
to co-organise the civil proceedings together with the judge when the 
public interest so required213. 
 The appeal procedure was fundamentally transformed as it obtained 
the features of the revision and was adapted to the new system of common 
courts, which were deprived of the attribute of independence214. Wider 
opportunities to appeal were granted to the authorities of prosecution and 
the Minister of Justice. The appeal was replaced by the revision and  
the cassation appeal by an extraordinary revision. However, these process 
instruments were not similar to those that existed in the countries  
of Western Europe, where, among others, the term of revision was also 
used. The Supreme Court also received the competence to issue the 
guidelines of justice and judicial practice that were binding for all judges215. 
Changes included also judicial enforcement proceedings, from which some 
cases were excluded and subjected to administrative enforcement. The new 
regulations underwent broad interpretation referring to the political  
                                                   
212  On the inconsistencies of the prosecutor’s general supervision and its consequences  
see: M. Łysko, Prokuratorski nadzór ogólny w Polsce w latach 1950-1967. Studium 
historycznoprawne [The Prosecutor General Supervision in Poland 1950-1967. Historical and Legal 
Study], Białystok 2006, pp. 45-49, 91-94.  
213  See: K. Stefko, Udział prokuratora w postępowaniu cywilnym [Prosecutor’s Participation in the 
Civil Proceedings], Warszawa 1956, p. 54; Z. Włodyka, Powództwo prokuratora w polskim procesie 
cywilnym [Prosecutor’s Claim in the Polish Civil Process], Warszawa 1957. 
214  Law of 20.07.1950 on the amendment of the Law on common courts, Dz.U. [Journal  
of Laws] No. 38, item 347; law of 29.12.1951 on the amendment of the Law on common courts 
and the Code of Civil Procedure, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] 1952, No. 1, item 5.  
215 See more: A. Bereza, Sąd Najwyższy w latach 1945-1962. Organizacja i działalność  
[The Supreme Court in the Years 1945-1962. Organisation and Activities], Warszawa 2012,  
pp. 182-190.  
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and economic situation, and above all, the will of the people implementing 
the principle of popular sovereignty. 
 The decodification of 1950 was presented as a solution modernising 
and democratising Polish civil proceedings216. However, the vast majority 
of Polish lawyers were very critical about it, especially with regard to the 
principles of the appeal proceedings217. In fact, the introduced solutions 
increased state involvement in the resolution of civil cases, both by limiting 
the rights of the parties in the process and by providing the possibility  
of correcting judicial decisions by surveillance measures bypassing 
instances. In fact, the organs of executive power became the biggest 
beneficiary of the changes. In addition to legislative actions the pressure  
on judges was increased by proclaiming, like some lawyers, that the civil 
proceedings were one of the institutions of the forced implementation  
of economic development218. They also reminded people that courts  
had not been a separate power since the principle of division of powers  
had been abandoned.  
 Despite the announcement that the amendments of law would have  
a broader scope219 and the settlement of disputes would entirely lose  
its former character220, just as in the Soviet and Czechoslovak legislation, 
                                                   
216  J. Jodłowski, Sprawozdanie stenograficzne z LXXXIV posiedzenia Sejmu Ustawodawczego  
w dnia 20-21.07.1950 r. [Scenographic Record of LXXXIV Meeting of the Legislative Sejm  
on 20-21.07.1950], Warszawa 1951, para. 44. 
217  See: Stawarska-Ripppel, supra note 187, pp. 180-181, 333-337. 
218  “Law cannot tolerate the alleged conflict of interests between an individual and society, 
because there is only one kind of contradiction – class”; S. Szer, Kilka uwag na temat pojęcia 
interesu społecznego w prawie cywilnym [Some Remarks on the Concept of Public Interest in Civil 
Law], Demokratyczny Przegląd Prawniczy [Democratic Legal Review] 1950, no. 1, p. 38.  
219 See: Z. Kliszko, W pięciolecie wymiaru sprawiedliwości [On the Fifth Anniversary of Justice], 
Demokratyczny Przegląd Prawniczy [Democratic Legal Review] 1950, no. 6-7; Protocol no. 34 
from the meeting of the Political Office of KC PZPR of 19.04.1950, quoted after Z.A. Ziemba , 
Prawo przeciwko społeczeństwu. Polskie prawo karne (1944-1956) [Law Against Society. Polish 
Criminal Law (1944-1956)], Warszawa 1997, p. 55. See more: A. Lityński, O kodyfikacji procedury 
cywilnej w Polsce Ludowej [On the Codification of Civil Procedure in the Polish People’s Republic], 
[in:] J. Malec, W. Uruszczak (eds), Ustrój i prawo w przeszłości dalszej i bliższej. Studia 
historyczne o prawie dedykowane prof. Stanisławowi Grodziskiemu w pięćdziesiątą rocznicę pracy 
naukowej [The Organisational Structure and Law in the More Distant and More Recent Past. 
Historical Studies on Law Dedicated to Prof. Stanisław Grodziski in the Fiftieth Anniversary  
of His Scientific Work], Kraków 2001, pp. 541-543; Grzybowski, supra note 21, p. 96 et seq.  
220  See: J. Jodłowski, Nowy etap przebudowy polskiego procesu cywilnego [The New Phase  
of the Reconstruction of Polish Civil Process], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 1953, no. 5.  
 
135   |   The Principles of Civil Procedure in Poland in the Twentieth Century. Doctrine, Drafts and Law… 
the new Code was not adopted. The legislative works were prolonged 
when, owing to the inconsistency of the political and economic system  
in Poland, difficulties appeared which concerned the development of legal 
structures that would effectively regulate the legal relations included  
in the Code and at the same time would satisfy the assumptions of  
Marxist ideology in its Soviet interpretation. Contrary to the distributed 
information, the legal doctrine practiced in the Soviet Union was not 
helpful in this regard221. The new draft focused on the elimination of the 
litigious nature of the civil proceedings, which meant that apart from 
controversial solutions there were also a number of significant legal 
defects. 
 The above recodification plans become outdated in 1956. In Poland, 
social protests and personnel changes in the circles of authorities took place 
at that time. They contributed to the controlled adjustment of economic 
policy, which required the withdrawal of certain restrictive legal practices 
and the preparation of new concepts concerning the regulation of some 
parts of economic relations. This created a chance for the evolutionary 
nature of the following changes and for the maintenance or restoration  
of some procedural guarantees of citizens’ rights. Polish civil procedure, 
following “its own, Polish road to socialism”222, was to take advantage  
of the achievements of the Polish legal doctrine, including those from  
the interwar period223, and to have a positive impact on those elements  
of the legal system which had already been substantially changed under 
the slogan of socialist progress224. The new Codification Commission225 was 
                                                                                                                           
The litigious proceedings “in fact were supposed to disappear in favour of non-litigious 
proceedings”, Lityński, supra note 198, p. 59. 
221  Already at the beginning of the initial phase of codification procedure the Soviet 
solutions were presented, see: J. Winiarz, Z zagadnień kodyfikacji postępowania cywilnego. 
Postulaty de lege ferenda [On the issues of the codification of civil proceedings], Nowe Prawo [New 
Law] 1952, p. 15. 
222  Sprawozdanie z prac Komisji Kodyfikacyjnej [The Report From the Work of the Codification 
Commission], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 1957, no. 3, p. 621. 
223  The autonomous nature of the Commmission was emphasised by, inter alia, the Rules  
of the Codification Commission, see more: P. Fiedorczyk, Unifikacja i kodyfikacja prawa prawa 
rodzinnego w Polsce (1945-1964) [The Unification and Codification of Family Law in Poland (1945-
1964)], Białystok 2014, pp. 297-300.  
224  See: Z. Izdebski, Rewizja pojęcia praworządności ludowej [The Revision of the Concept  
of the People’s Rule of Law], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 1957, no. 3, pp. 443-454. About 
the role of a judge in the interpretation of the norms of the people’s law which underwent 
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aware that the principles of Polish civil proceedings had again become  
an open issue226.  
 The draft of the new Code was presented in 1960227. The main 
difference between this document and the previous draft was the 
maintenance of two types of proceedings: litigious and non-litigious228  
and the moderate limitation of the adversarial and dispositive principles  
in favour of the powers of courts and prosecutors. In comparison  
to the principles that had been in force since 1950, those changes were not 
so significant and they still maintained the controversial solutions229. 
However, the government, monitoring the work of the Commission, found 
that the draft too little implemented political directives, and therefore  
it introduced some significant adjustments, sometimes outside the official 
mode of legislative proceedings230. The new draft increased the powers  
of judges and prosecutors, privileged the units of the socialised economy231, 
and again limited the distinctions between litigious and non-litigious 
proceedings. Only then could permission to adopt the new law be granted. 
                                                                                                                           
“oscillation interpretation” because of their semantic indeterminacy or “adaptation to the 
needs of life” see more: J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii wykładni prawa ludowego [The Issues  
of the Theory of Interpretation of People’s Law], Warszawa 1959, pp. 203-206.  
225 The Codification Commission was established by the Regulation of the President  
of the Council of Ministers of 23.08.1956, and its inaugural meeting took place on 17.12.1956; 
see Sprawozdanie z prac Komisji Kodyfikacyjnej [The Report From the Work of the Codification 
Commission], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 1957, no. 3, pp. 620-621.  
226 Lisiewski, supra note 141, p. 17.  
227  Z. Resich, Projekt kodeksu postępowania cywilnego po pierwszym czytaniu [The Draft  
of the Code of Civil Procedure After the First Reading], Nowe Prawo [New Law] 1960, no. 1, p. 3 
et seq.; W. Siedlecki, Z prac Komisji Kodyfikacyjnej nad nowym kodeksem postępowania cywilnego 
PRL [On the Work of the Codification Commission on the New Code of Civil Procedure], Studia 
Cywilistyczne [Civilistic Studies] 1961, vol. I, p. 301 et seq.  
228 See: M. Lisiewski, Scalenie postępowania spornego i niespornego [The Consolidation  
of Litigious and Non-Litigious Proceedings], Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego [Acta 
Universitatis Lodziensis] 1959, no. 14, p. 83.  
229  See: Siedlecki, supra note 226, p. 302. 
230  Inter ales: Article 539 § 1 and Article 831 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, see:  
W. Siedlecki, Kilka uwag na temat wykładni i stosowania przepisów nowego Kodeksu postępowania 
cywilnego [Some Remarks on the Interpretation and Application of the Provisions of the New Code  
of Civil Procedure], Studia Cywilistyczne [Civilistic Studies] 1969, vol. XII-XIV, p. 291. More 
about the methods and content of the amendments introduced to the draft see: Stawarska-
Rippel, supra note 187, pp. 357-360.  
231 See: J. Krajewski, Gwarancje ochrony własności społecznej w postępowaniu cywilnym 
(rozpoznawczym) [The Guarantees of the Protection of Social Property in the Civil Proceedings 
(examination proceedings)], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 1965, no. 7. 
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 3. THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF 1964 
 
 The Code of Civil Procedure, adopted on 17 November 1964232, 
according to the declarations of the authorities, was supposed to be a legal 
act responding to the needs of the advanced socio-economic development 
of the Polish People’s Republic and a proof of the achievements  
of the socialist doctrine of civil procedure. This ambitious goal was 
presented as the justification for a long period of waiting for the completion 
of these actions. It was emphasised that it would solve the constant 
problem of the low efficiency of courts of general jurisdiction. 
 The facts concerning recodification were not so clear. Firstly, the new 
legal provisions came from different legal traditions and the motivation  
for maintaining or introducing them was not uniform. Secondly, many  
civil law relations were not subject to the provisions of the Code and  
at the same time a lot of restrictions of legal proceedings were maintained, 
including Article 2 of the Code, which sanctioned extrajudicial recognition 
of lawsuits between the entities of the socialised economy and entitled  
the government to issue special legal provisions which regulated the 
settling of other civil cases in the procedure going beyond the jurisdiction 
of courts. In the conditions of a nationalised economy it lowered the impact 
of the new law. Thirdly, the authorities still intended to apply the 
teleological interpretation of law, which created the possibility, in the case 
of dispositional judges, of the implementation of current political interests 
regardless of the wording of certain provisions. 
 The content of the Code of 1964 was influenced by several circumstances, 
such as: the political situation, the attitude of the representatives of Polish  
legal doctrine, and the condition of Soviet jurisprudence. At the time when  
the Codification Commission started to work in 1956, the authorities decided 
to introduce some slight liberalisation in order to calm down the social mood 
and improve the economy. For this reason, in the course of discussions  
on the reform of the legal system, including civil proceedings, there were 
signs that primarily the achievements of the Polish legal doctrine should  
                                                   
232  Law of 17.11.1964, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 43, item 296. The mistakes in the text 
were corrected by the announcement of the President of the Council of Ministers  
of 23.04.1965, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 15, item 113.  
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be taken into account. When the Codification Commission finished its 
activity, the government again returned to the rhetoric of socialist 
ideology233. As a result, the Commission’s proposal was subjected  
to a second editorial review and then modified. Some additional elements, 
similar to the principles of the civil proceedings applied in other socialist 
countries including the text of the new Soviet legislation (1961 – The 
principles of the civil procedure of the USSR and the union republics), were 
introduced. 
 Referring to the then Polish doctrine of the civil procedural law, not 
only diverse views, but also the attitude of members of the Codification 
Committee and jurists, whose concepts were used, proved to be equally 
important for the content of the Code principles234. Among them there were 
people with professional experience from the period of the Second 
Republic, who possessed a great understanding of the civil procedures and 
their legal and cultural consequences in other countries. They were making 
efforts to maintain the essence of adversarial and dispositive principles 
despite the numerous limitations235. Other members of the Commission 
were in favour of far-reaching changes236, strongly arguing the original 
provisions of the Code of 1930. As an alternative, they proposed concepts 
of the socialist legal doctrine. Meanwhile, the Soviet system of civil 
procedural law was undergoing reconstruction. Its consolidation started  
in 1957237, and the new code, which implemented ideological assumptions 
that had been announced long time before238, was adopted in 1964. 
However, some parts of its provisions were very vague, inversely 
proportional to the legal definitions of an increasing number of functions 
assigned to the civil proceedings. At the same time, some solutions  
                                                   
233 See more: J. Skąpski, Kodeks cywilny z 1964 r. Blaski i cienie kodyfikacji i jej perspektywy   
[The Civil Code of 1964. Pros and Cons of the Codification and Its Prospects], Kwartalnik Prawa 
Prywatnego [The Private Law Quarterly] 1992, vol. 1, p. 75.  
234 See more: Czachórski, supra note 21, pp. 14-15; Grzybowski, supra note 21; Lityński, 
supra note 21, pp. 151-153; Stawarska-Rippel, supra note 187, pp. 221-234. 
235 Lisiewski, supra note 141, p. 12; Resich, supra note 143, pp. 56-69. 
236 An example is the opinion of J. Jodłowski, who proposed the amendment of the Code 
using the same arguments as in the first half of 50s and at the beginning of the 60s, see:  
J. Jodłowski, Z zagadnień polskiego procesu cywilnego [On the Issues of the Polish Civil Process], 
Warszawa 1961, pp. 25, 26.  
237 See: Lubiński, supra note 17, p. 230. 
238  See: Stawarska-Rippel, supra note 189, pp. 141-142. 
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of the USSR legislation, including the limitation of the adversarial principle, 
were only a creative adaptation of the principles derived from other 
jurisdictions239. These circumstances meant that Soviet jurisprudence was 
not able to offer too many really new procedural solutions so instead  
it was limited to modifications and presenting several variants of already 
existing elements.  
 The attitude of some Polish lawyers involved on the side of the classical 
principles of law and the problems faced by “socialist jurisprudence” 
decided that in its normative layer the Code of Civil Procedure of 1964 was 
not as avant-garde as had been announced by the authorities. It confirmed 
the shift of boundaries between the rights of the parties and the competences 
of courts and prosecutors, as well as the modification the scope of conduct  
of the litigious and non-litigious proceedings. The procedure was dominated 
by the principle of inquiry, but, it maintained some degree of procedural 
autonomy of the parties. Thus, the Polish legal system retained some 
provisions of the civil procedure which corresponded to the classical 
principles240. The presence of some of these principles resulted from their 
universal functionality. The principles of the Code of Civil Procedure  
of 1964, and above all their specification in special provisions were shaped 
by the compilation of: some standards of the Polish civil procedure applied 
in 1930, the principles and institutions implemented to the system after 
1944 in order to make the forced transformation of the political system,  
and the independent achievements of post-war Polish legal doctrine.  
The editorial aspect of the Code should also be mentioned as it was  
as precise as possible in order to prevent its instrumental use. The official 
presentation of the Code and the structure of its first part were supposed  
to indicate the differences and progress between the law of 1930 and  
the law of 1964. For this reason, the new guiding principles of the process 
were pointed out in the first place, starting from the principle of objective 
                                                   
239 Attention to this fact was drawn by Stawarska -Rippel, supra note 187, p. 364. 
240  See: Siedlecki, supra note 229, pp. 291-292; E. Wengerek, Demokratyzacja procesu 
cywilnego w Polsce Ludowej [The democratisation of civil process in the Polish People’s Republic], 
Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny [Journal of Law, Economics and Sociology] 
1975, no. 1, p. 39; Lityński, supra note 218, p. 64.  
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truth that was treated as “the principle of principles”241 and the principle  
of the protection of social property, through the principle of “real” equality 
of the parties, and the principle of controlled ability to exercise rights 
concerning the subject of the process, to the principle of moderate 
formalism242. All these principles together legitimised the rights and duties 
of judges and public prosecutors in a wider way than had been previously. 
They were implemented through the limitation of the principle that courts 
should be bound by the request presented in the lawsuit243 and the content 
of the bases of appeal244, the possibility of taking evidence ex officio without 
any limitation, the additional procedural duties in cases involving the 
entities representing social property, as well as the unlimited competence  
of prosecutors to initiate and join the civil process. The Code also took  
into account the classical principles of conduct: the principle of open 
proceedings, the principle of oral proceedings, the principle of immediacy, 
the principle of the free appraisal of evidence, and the principle of the 
judge’s control over the proceedings. 
 The first of the guiding principles – objective (material) truth was 
established on two levels. The first meant the obligation of the parties and 
participants in the proceedings to speak the truth. Its breach did not cause 
any sanctions, but it was justified by loyalty to the process and the 
prohibition of the abuse of rights in the process245. The second level, which 
was addressed to courts, established a duty to investigate and clarify the 
actual content of the factual and legal relations in cases which enabled 
courts to take ex officio actions that were considered necessary in order  
to supplement the materials and evidence submitted by the parties.  
                                                   
241  See: J. Jodłowski, Zasady naczelne socjalistycznego postępowania cywilnego [The Fundamental 
Principles of the Socialist Civil Proceedings], [in:] J. Jodłowski (ed.), Wstęp do systemu prawa 
procesowego cywilnego [Introduction to the System of Civil Procedural Law], Warszawa 1974, p. 75. 
242 See more: W. Siedlecki, Zasady naczelne postępowania cywilnego w świetle przepisów nowego 
kodeksu postępowania cywilnego [The Fundamental Principles of the Civil Proceedings in the Light  
of the Provisions of the New Code of Civil Procedure], Studia Cywilistyczne [Civilistic  
Studies] 1966, vol. VII, p. 3 et seq. 
243 See more: Piasecki, supra note 114. 
244  See more: S. Hanausek, System zaskarżania orzeczeń sądowych w nowym polskim 
postępowaniu cywilnym [The System of Appeal Against Judgements in the New Polish Civil 
Proceedings], Studia Cywilistyczne [Civilistic Studies] 1967, vol. IX, p. 155.  
245  See: K. Piasecki, Nadużycie praw procesowych przez strony [The Abuse of Procedural Rights 
by the Parties], Palestra [The Bar] 1960, no. 11, p. 20. 
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In relation to this competence of the court, the legislator used the terms 
“should” and “may” (Article 3 of the Code), however, the interpretation  
of this provision relied on the theory of “the ability that in a particular case 
can turn into a duty”246. Against this background, there appeared views  
on the principle of the cooperation between participants of the civil 
process, which even more relativised the adversarial principle247. Most  
of the representatives of Polish jurisprudence opted for the interpretation 
maintaining the adversarial principle, which was to coexist with new 
principles, including the principle of objective truth. In their opinion, it was 
primarily justified by the use of the previously known less interventionist 
institution of admonishment (Article 5 of the Code), while maintaining 
restraint in the use of more powerful measures by the court. 
 The court’s right to take evidence ex officio and to take account of facts 
not covered by the claims of the parties, resulting from the provisions  
of the Code (“the court may” – Article 3 § 2; Article 232), remained  
in a direct relation to the principle of objective truth. These rights were not 
limited by any requirements and the court had also the right to order  
an investigation in order to determine the evidence necessary for issuing 
the decision. The judicature emphasised the desirability of using this 
solution especially in cases involving the protection of the social interest, 
identified with state entities or social and family relations248. However,  
in cases related to “the rights of status”, concerning the civil situation  
of a person, it was claimed that the principle of objective truth “did not 
                                                   
246  The resolution of the Supreme Court of 27.06.1953, CIC/C Prez 195/52, Orzecznictwo 
Sądu Najwyższego [Decisions of the Supreme Court] 1953, no. 4, item 95; see: J. Jodłowski,  
K. Piasecki (eds), Kodeks postępowania cywilnego z komentarzem [The Code of Civil Procedure With 
a Commentary], Warszawa 1989, p. 39. 
247 See: W. Siedlecki, Zasada kontradyktoryjności (sporności) czy zasada współdziałania 
podmiotów postępowania cywilnego [The Adversarial Principle or the Principle of Cooperation 
Between the Participants in Civil Proceedings], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 1975, no. 6,  
p. 63. 
248 The resolution of the Supreme Court of 15.07.1974, C/ZO/Kw Pr 2/74, Orzecznictwo 
Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna/Pracy [Decisions of the Supreme Court – Civil/Labor 
Law Chamber] 1974, no. 12, item 203; the resolution of the Supreme Court of 9.06.1976,  
III CZP 46/75, Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna/Pracy [Decisions  
of the Supreme Court – Civil/Labor Law Chamber] 1976, no. 9, item 184. 
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reign supreme”249. Jurists supporting the maintaining of the adversarial 
principle and its process traditions, even together with evidence taken  
ex officio, emphasised that the powers of the judge did not remove the 
burden of proof that primarily rested with the parties of the process250. 
 On the other hand, the court’s right to adjudicate on subject matter not 
covered by the request or to adjudge over the request, which were 
sanctioned by the Code, derived from another legal culture. The court was 
not bound by the scope of maintenance claims, claims for damages in tort 
actions, as well as all cases with the participation, as a plaintiff, of the units 
of the socialised economy (Article 321). A similar solution was applied  
in cases in which courts were bound by the scope of the revision.  
The previously known exceptions, concerning taking into account ex officio 
the conditions of the annulment of the proceedings, such as the infringement 
of substantive law or not explaining the relevant facts, were supplemented 
by the conditions specified in Article 321, to which cases concerning non-
property rights were added (Article 381). The possibility of adjudging more 
than requested also concerned cases relating to labour law, in which  
an employee was a plaintiff (Article 475 § 2, then Article 477¹). In these 
cases, courts were also not bound by the scope and content of the revision 
(Article 475 § 3, then Article 477³). The interpretation of this provision was 
far-reaching, proving that courts were obliged to determine whether there 
were the conditions to adjudge more than requested, and, if so, to issue  
a decision granting broader process protection to the plaintiff251.  
 The limitation of the dispositive principle252 referred also to judicial 
control of such actions as: withdrawal of a lawsuit, limitation or waiver  
                                                   
249  The resolution of the Supreme Court of 7.04.1971, III CZP 87/70, Orzecznictwo Sądu 
Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna/Pracy [Decisions of the Supreme Court – Civil/Labor Law 
Chamber] 1972, no. 3, item 42. 
250 See: W. Broniewicz, Zasad kontradyktoryjności procesu cywilnego w poglądach nauki polskiej 
(1880-1980) [The Principle of Adversarial Civil Proceedings in the Views of Polish Legal Doctrine 
(1880-1980)], [in:] M. Jędrzejewska, T. Ereciński (eds), Studia z prawa postępowania cywilnego. 
Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Zbigniewa Resicha [Studies on Civil Procedural Law. Commemorative 
Book in Honour of Zbigniew Resich], Warszawa 1985, p. 39. 
251  See: Piasecki, supra note 242, p. 38. 
252 See more: J. Lapierre, Kontrola sądowa czynności dyspozycyjnych stron i uczestników  
w postępowaniu cywilnym [The Judicial Control of Dispositive Actions of the Parties and the 
Participants in Civil Proceedings], [in:] Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Kamila Stefki [Commemorative 
Book in Honour of Kamil Stefka], Wrocław-Warszawa 1967, p. 183.  
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of a claim, as well as a consent judgement, withdrawal of a revision, 
objection to a default judgment, or allegations to the writ. It was linked 
with the reasons of non-compliance of these actions with law, the principles 
of social coexistence, or a condition of flagrant violation of the interests  
of entitled persons (e.g. in Article 203 § 4, Article 184, Article 393 § 2,  
Article 497 § 1). In the doctrine of Polish procedural law the social 
significance of these provisions was appreciated, however, it was 
emphasised that there was a need for their strict interpretation as  
an exception to the dispositive principle. The provision was formulated  
in a way which indirectly created a duty to examine these circumstances 
each time and then the lack of consent to withdraw a lawsuit or to resign  
or to limit the claim. The court was not bound by a recognition of the claim, 
maintaining full freedom in this regard (Article 213 § 2). 
 The principle of the equal rights of the parties functioned to a limited 
extent. That was because of the provisions providing courts and 
prosecutors with the right to take active actions in favour of the principle  
of objective truth, as well as the provisions which privileged entities 
representing the interests of the state. Their source was another guiding 
principle of the socialist civil process – the protection of social ownership 
(Article 4) and state institutions which did not conduct business activities 
(Article 14). In connection with the actual ownership structure in Poland, 
this principle was mainly related to the state ownership (other types  
of ownership occurred in a very small proportion). The courts’ duties  
in the process in this regard were scattered, ranging from the preventive 
signalisation, the notification of the prosecutor and the stronger courts’ 
control of dispositive actions, as well as the ability to summon  
to participate in a process as a defendant or to sue additional defendants  
ex officio, up to the possibility of adjudicating on the subject matter  
not covered by the request and to adjudge more than requested. 
 The principle of prosecutor participation in civil proceedings (Article 7) 
was worded very broadly. He could both bring an action and join each 
case, provided that in family law non-material cases the action could  
be brought only in cases provided by a statute which in practice excluded 
such activity only in cases of divorce. The conditions of prosecutor 
participation in the case, which limited the dispositive principle, were  
so conceptually capacious that they gave him full freedom of action 
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invoking the protection of: the rule of law, the rights of citizens, social 
interest and social ownership. 
 Attention should be also drawn to the method of legal regulation  
of the principle of concentration of the material submitted in court 
proceedings (Article 6), supporting the desired pace of the proceedings, 
which was associated with the preparatory activities of the court before  
the hearing (Article 208). It was partially supported by the provision 
determining the dates for presenting factual circumstances and evidence  
by the party. Before the court of first instance it was possible up to the end 
of the hearing, subject to the negative, but not nullifying, effects of playing 
for time or acting inconsistently with the relevant decrees and courts’ 
decisions (Article 217 § 1)253. This approach was justified by the primacy  
of the principle of objective truth. The evidence preclusion was provided  
in the proceedings before the court of second instance – entitling the parties 
to present in the basis of the revision or later, at the hearing before the court 
of second instance, only facts and evidence which could not be presented, 
respectively, before the court of first instance or in the revision  
(Article 371). 
 The system of appeals in the Code of 1964 was formed in accordance 
with arrangements introduced into the Polish system together with  
the decodification of 1950 with only slight modifications. The main means 
of instance appeal was the revision, the basics of which were widely 
regulated retaining their legal nature. The principle that courts were bound 
by the scope of the revision was subject to numerous exceptions, both 
connected with the type of legal shortcomings found by the court of appeal 
and the category of recognised cases (claims for intangible rights, alimony, 
compensation for the damage caused by a tort), as well as the entity 
bringing a revision (a unit of the socialised economy, an employee).  
The decision of the court of second instance on the merits was stipulated 
for breaches of substantive law, and in other cases only if the court had 
sufficient grounds for such settlement. The appeal against a final judgment 
was possible in the form of an extraordinary appeal. This institution  
was distinguished by: a narrow group of entities authorized to lodge  
                                                   
253 See: E. Wengerek, Koncentracja materiału procesowego w postępowaniu cywilnym   
[The Concentration of the Material Submitted in Civil Proceedings], Warszawa 1958. 
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an extraordinary appeal, which excluded the direct actions of the parties, 
the legal and political bases of the extraordinary appeal – a flagrant 
violation of law or the interests of Polish People’s Republic (Article 417), 
and the possibility of appealing in this mode against any final decision 
concluding the proceedings. 
 Compared with the general procedural principles prominently placed 
in the codes of other socialist countries, the Polish solutions in some cases 
were more sustainable – the principle of objective truth, in other cases they 
were regulated similarly widely – the principle of prosecutor participation 
in civil proceedings, the principle of taking evidence ex officio, whereas  
the Code regulation of the limited binding of courts by requests presented 
in a lawsuit or an appeal, provided courts with more freedom than 
procedures in other socialist countries did, except for the Soviet Code  
of civil procedure of 1964. 
 The further existence of the Code of 1964 for twenty-five years  
was very stable, like the state system, in which it functioned. The Code  
was amended several times, however, these amendments were caused  
by changes of substantive law, as it was in the cases of family law254,  
labour law, and social security255, as well as cooperative law and the law  
on personal and asset insurance. A chance to correct the provisions of civil 
law, including procedural law, appeared in Poland at the end of 1980, 
when the most massive public protests that took place in socialist countries 
resulted in the beginning of the development of the reform programme, 
mainly at the initiative of citizens. However, the reforms were blocked  
a year later, when the authorities decided to introduce martial law, during 
which and in subsequent years, they focused on maintaining the status quo. 
The Ministry of Justice was indeed active – eight amendments to the Code 
in 1982-1988 – but the critical issues and principles were carefully 
bypassed. 
 The lack of significant amendments to the Code, as well as the policy  
of the instrumental treatment of binding procural law through  
                                                   
254  Law of 18.07.1974 on the alimony fund, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 27, item 157; law  
of 19.12.1975 on the amendment of the Family and Guardianship Code, Dz.U. [Polish Journal 
of Laws] No. 45, item 234. 
255  Law of 24.10.1974, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 39, item 231; law of 18.04.1985 on the 
amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 20, item 86. 
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the teleological interpretation of selected provisions, which was previously 
implemented by authorities, meant that the actual content of the Code 
principles could be decided by the Supreme Court. This resulted from both 
the competences assigned to the Supreme Court within the judicial 
supervision, including the non-instance supervision, and the professional 
activity of judges of the Supreme Court – some of them had been earlier 
members of the Codification Commission or the authors of commentaries 
to the Code256. Most often, the Supreme Court interpreted provisions 
answering legal questions addressed by lower courts. Another form of the 
Supreme Court’s activity, this time usually initiated by the Minister  
of Justice who was privileged by the Code, was the mode of an 
extraordinary revision. Referring to the condition of the “infringement  
of the interests of the Polish People’s Republic”257, imposed by the 
government in the final stage of work on the code, the minister could bring 
accusations against selected judicial decisions, however, they did not 
concern the fundamental legal issues258. They were also not subject to the 
guidelines of the Supreme Court and the practice of justice. The resolution 
of the General Assembly of the Supreme Court of 1976 relating to the 
efficiency of judicial proceedings259, in the section on civil procedure, 
focused only on issues involving social ownership, urging judges to a more 
frequent admission of evidence ex officio and cooperation with prosecutors260. 
                                                   
256  See e.g.: Z. Resich, W. Siedlecki (eds), Komentarz do Kodeksu postępowania cywilnego 
[Commentary to the Code of Civil Procedure], Warszawa 1975. 
257 About the faulty treatment of the breach of interests of the Polish People’s Republic  
as an independent basis for an extraordinary revision, see: A. Mączyński, Glosa do orzeczenia 
SN z 25.10.1974 r., sygn. III PRN 38/74 [Commentary to the decision of the Supreme Court  
of 25.10.1974, III PRN 38/74], Nowe Prawo [New Law] 1978, no. 5, pp. 822-823.  
258  An example is the contested decision establishing 1 kilometer of road providing 
necessary access, which was considered by the minister as a decision affecting the 
fundamental interests of the Polish People’s Republic. The scale of the problem was signaled 
by: A. Miączyński, Z dyskusyjnej problematyki rewizji nadzwyczajnej w postępowaniu cywilnym  
[On the Arguable Issue of an Extraordinary Revision in the Civil Proceedings], Studia 
Cywilistyczne [Civilistic Studies] 1967, vol. X, p. 156.  
259 The resolution of the General Assembly of the Supreme Court of 15.07.1974,  
KWPR 2/74, Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna/Pracy [Decisions of the 
Supreme Court – Civil/Labor Law Chamber] 1974, no. 12, item 203. 
260 See: P. Piszczek (ed.), Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego. Postępowanie cywilne [The Supreme 
Court Rulings. Civil Proceedings], Białystok 1992, pp. 567-568. 
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 “Difficult cases” requiring legal analysis did not appear before  
the Supreme Court often owing to defective provisions, which were  
also pushed through by the government, governing the procedure  
of the extraordinary revision. However, the postulates to amend the Code 
formulated by the legal doctrine, which aimed to extend the right to bring 
an extraordinary revision and to introduce the institution of pre-trial261, 
were not accepted, as with other proposed amendments. Meanwhile, 
Polish jurisprudence developed a number of procedural issues, including: 
procedural conditions, constituent judgments, judgments of review court, 
immediate enforceability of judgments, effectiveness of judgements, 
subjective transformation of a lawsuit, and procedural succession, as well 
as prosecutor participation262. 
 The Supreme Court’s case-law did not correct the principles of Polish 
procedure, subjecting them primarily to linguistic and functional 
interpretation263. The Supreme Court contributed, however, to the analysis 
of issues arising from the legislative compilation of several legal standards 
and the vicissitudes of Polish civil procedure. Among problems which 
aroused great interest were Article 2 and Article 13 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, the first of which referred exclusively to the principles  
of the Code, and the second to the appropriate application of provisions 
concerning the process in non-litigious proceedings. This was related  
to still existing serious restrictions of the jurisdiction of common courts,  
the functioning of some proceedings that were not covered by the 
provisions of the Code, as well as the instrumental shifting of boundaries 
between the litigious and non-litigious modes. In relation to the principle  
of objective truth, also the judicial involvement in dispositive actions  
of the parties264, the admissibility of adjudication over request265 and the 
                                                   
261  See more: Miączyński, supra note 257, pp. 160-161, 176-177.  
262  See more: S. Włodyka, Współuczestnictwo konieczne w procesie cywilnym [Required  
Co-Participation in the Civil Process], Studia Cywilistyczne [Civilistic Studies] 1967, vol. X,  
p. 108, 127; W. Broniewicz, Powództwo prokuratora w polskim procesie cywilnym [Prosecutor’s 
Action in the Polish Civil Process], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 1966, no. 7-8, p. 36;  
T. Potapowicz (ed.), Powództwo prokuratora w sprawach z art. 412 Kodeksu cywilnego 
[Prosecutor’s Action Brought in Cases from Art. 412 of the Civil Code], Warszawa 1970. 
263  On the bases of the analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Court issued in years  
1966-1985, see: Piszczek, supra note 260. 
264  See: the decision of the Supreme Court of 12.03.1965, I PR 6/65, Orzecznictwo Sądu 
Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna/Pracy [Decisions of the Supreme Court – Civil/Labor Law 
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ability to take new facts and evidence ex officio by the court of second 
instance266 were considered. The principle of objective truth was also 
combined with the provisions concerning the burden of proof267 while 
interpreting the duties of a judge in the following sequence: boosting 
requests for granting evidence, taking evidence ex officio, settlement of the 
case with the reference to the burden of proof – in case of the ineffectiveness 
of the second of the actions268. This concept was promoted for the benefit  
of the interests of the units of a socialised economy. It was a symbolic 
example of the inconsistency of the political and economic ideology  
of socialist law. When authorities pressed for the granting of additional 
powers to judges and prosecutors, limiting dispositive and adversarial 
principles, they relied on the socially popular argument of the need  
to support economically weak units. At the time when these principles 
entered into force, it turned out that the entities, which should have 
benefited from this preference were state-owned enterprises, officially 
presented as the economic vanguard269. Meanwhile, the reason for their 
procedural passiveness was their legal and factual dependence270. 
                                                                                                                           
Chamber] 1966, no. 2, item 18; the decision of the Supreme Court of 5.11.1966, II CR 387/66, 
Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna/Pracy [Decisions of the Supreme Court – 
Civil/Labor Law Chamber] 1967, no. 7-8, item 133, thesis 3 of the sentence. 
265 See: the resolution of the Supreme Court of 30.05.1966, III PZP 15/66, Orzecznictwo 
Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna/Pracy [Decisions of the Supreme Court – Civil/Labor 
Law Chamber] 1966, no. 12, item 204. 
266  See more: Hanausek, supra note 242, p. 175.  
267  Article 3 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure – the resolution of the Supreme Court  
of 9.06.1976, III CZP 46/75, Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna/Pracy 
[Decisions of the Supreme Court – Civil/Labor Law Chamber] 1976, no. 9, item 184;  
the decision of the Supreme Court of 5.02.1980, IV PR 376/79, Orzecznictwo Sądu 
Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna/Pracy [Decisions of the Supreme Court – Civil/Labor  
Law Chamber] 1980, no. 9, item 173; the resolution of the Supreme Court of 10.11.1986,  
III CZP 17/86, Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna/Pracy [Decisions of the 
Supreme Court – Civil/Labor Law Chamber] 1987, no. 3, item 145. 
268  The resolution of the Supreme Court of 21.09.1969, III PZP 24/69, Orzecznictwo Sądu 
Najwyższego [Decisions of the Supreme Court] 1970, item 76. 
269  See: J. Pietrzykowski, Orzecznictwo sądów w sprawach cywilnych [Courts’ Rulings in Civil 
Cases], Biuletyn Ministerstwa Sprawiedliwości [Ministry of Justice Bulletin] 1966, no. 1, p. 65; 
J. Suchecki, Egzekucja należności jednostek gospodarki uspołecznionej [The Execution of Receivables 
of the Units of a Socialised Economy], Zeszyty Problemowo-Analityczne Ministerstwa 
Sprawiedliwości [Problem-Analitical Journal of the Ministry of Justice] 1971, no. 19,  
pp. 99-124. 
270  See: Machnikowska, supra note 201, pp. 373-377, 381-385, 580-590. 
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 The principles of social coexistence were also important for the 
principles of civil procedure. They were formulated by the Code as  
a general clause in order to prevent the abuse of subjective rights. The 
principles were invoked several times in the Code of Civil Procedure,  
for example while regulating the judicial review of dispositive actions  
of the parties. But in political practice they were assigned an additional 
function, in some cases resulting in the actual acquisition of rights by  
an unauthorised person. Especially, this was the case during the ownership 
transformation, when citizens affected by the situation and seeking 
protection were constantly refused such protection (their claims were 
dismissed), and the Supreme Court began to treat these judgments as  
res judicata271. Consequently, even though the Supreme Court emphasised 
the requirement to sufficiently define the content of the principles of social 
coexistence, if the court had taken it into account it would usually  
have functioned in a very general form272. This created the possibility  
of favouring one of the parties, not always associated with the idea of the 
humanism of a society building socialism and at the same time caring  
for granting mutual assistance, which was indicated in the subsequent 
guidelines of the Supreme Court273. 
 
 4. THE CHANGE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE – 1996 
 
 For the operation of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1964, as well as for 
the whole system of law in Poland, a landmark date was the year 1989. Due 
to the progressive failure of the economic model and the still existing social 
opposition against state authorities, change of the political system became 
possible. It restored the legal guarantees of citizens’ freedoms, which  
had been eliminated, starting from the independence of the judiciary 
and the autonomy of individuals in the sphere of civil law relations. 
Although the Code of Civil Procedure was not an act that was immediately 
                                                   
271  The resolution of the Supreme Court of 4.07.1969, III CRN 231/69; Orzecznictwo Sądu 
Najwyższego [Decisions of the Supreme Court] 1970, item 72. 
272  See more: T. Justyński, Nadużycie prawa w polskim prawie cywilnym [The Abuse of Rights  
in the Polish Civil Law], Kraków 2000, pp. 114-152, 201-205. 
273  The resolution of the Supreme Court of 18.05.1968, III CZP 70/66, Orzecznictwo Sądu 
Najwyższego [Decisions of the Supreme Court] 1968, item 77. 
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changed, its rank increased already in 1989-1990 with the abolition  
of the restrictions on taking legal actions and thereby the extent  
of the scope of the Code’s procedural principles, as well as the restoration 
of the classical principles of substantive civil law274. The systemic reform  
of the Code of Civil Procedure took place a few years later, in 1996275.  
It had a much more serious nature than in the case of the Civil Code276, not 
only removing solutions imposed by socialist legal doctrine, but also 
introducing principles and regulations which met the needs of a society 
functioning in the twenty-first century. At that time some disputes also re-
emerged, derived from the interwar period, about the ratio between various 
functions of civil process and the methods of management of the courts’ 
efficiency through procedural provisions.  
 In the first place, the new provisions strengthened the adversarial 
process. The restrictions of the dispositive principle were decreased, 
though the right to adjudge more than requested and to take evidence  
ex officio as well as the judicial control of dispositive actions were retained. 
The provisions relating to these issues were modified by limiting the scope 
of their application. On the other hand, the system of legal remedies 
underwent far-reaching transformations, restoring the institutions  
of an appeal and a cassation (a cassation appeal), in a modified, with 
respect to the Code of 1930, form. The extensive procedural rights were 
maintained by the prosecutor. 
 The nature of the changes, which were relevant primarily to the 
adversarial principle, was announced by the amendment of the wording  
of the principle of truth, which revoked the part of the provision referring 
to the court’s duties (Article 3). The principle of the privileged protection  
of social ownership, by which entities became subject to the full jurisdiction 
of common courts and hence the binding force of the Code of Civil 
Procedure in 1989, was also abolished. Not only did Article 4 lose its 
binding force, but also the prerequisite for the protection of social ownership 
was removed from other provisions entitling courts or prosecutors to 
                                                   
274  Law of 28.07.1990, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 55, item 321. 
275  Law of 1.03.1996, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws] No. 43, item 189. 
276  Such a method was used to amended the Civil Code in the part regulating ownership 
and limited real rights. Ideological Articles 126-139 of the Civil Code were repealed, but  
the vast majority of the other provisions were maintained.  
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increased activity, also in the sphere of dispositive actions. At the same 
time, the majority of entities, classified as the representatives of social 
property acquired legal personality and financial independence, providing 
their full judicial and procedural capacity.  
 The reduction of the restrictions of the dispositive principle was based, 
among others, on changing the wording of certain provisions concerning 
the judicial review of dispositive actions – the withdrawal of a lawsuit  
or the limitation of an action. They clearly obtained the nature of rights, 
and not obligations (“may consider”), which could be performed only  
in enumerated cases, among which the condition of gross violation  
of the interests of entitled persons was replaced by the criterion  
of circumventing the law. The amendment of 1996 also introduced  
the principle that courts were bound by recognised claims (Article 213), 
subject to judicial review of the same conditions as for the withdrawal  
of a lawsuit. The regulations concerning the judicial settlement,  
the withdrawal of allegations, and the objection to the default judgment 
were maintained without any changes. 
 While maintaining the courts’ right to take evidence ex officio,  
the wording of the relevant provision was partly changed by removing 
their additional right to order an investigation in order to determine  
the necessary evidence. The fact that the possibility of taking evidence  
ex officio became a procedural exception resulted primarily from the repeal 
of the normative duties of a judge with respect to the principle of objective 
truth, which was not visible in Article 232. The burden of proof was once 
again transferred on the parties in order to reconstruct the classic 
adversarial principle. Also the restrictions of the dispositive principle were 
amended – cases brought by the units of socialised economy were removed 
from the list of exceptions concerning the courts’ right to adjudge more 
than requested.  
 The appeal proceedings were also subject to important 
transformations. Providing new legal remedies, the legislator decided  
to introduce the model of a full appeal. The judgment of the court of first 
instance in any case could be challenged in this mode and there were  
no restrictions concerning the basis of the appeal. The court of second 
instance received the right to conduct evidence proceedings and to issue 
judgement on the merits. The exceptions from the principle that the court 
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shall be bound by the scope of requests presented in the appeal included 
only conditions concerning the nullity of the proceedings and not hearing 
the substance of the case by the court of first instance. The cassation was 
established as a non-instance means of surveillance. The right to lodge  
the cassation was subject to numerous limitations starting from objective 
exemptions, through the regulation of the grounds of appeal – having  
only a legal nature: the misinterpretation or incorrect application  
of substantive law, or the procedural infringements having a significant 
impact on the outcome of the case. The cassation could be lodged above  
all by the parties in the case while the prosecutor could lodge it only if he 
participated in the appeal proceedings. Eliminating the previous 
dominance of political factors, the right to appeal was not granted to the 
Minister of Justice. The proceedings by the Supreme Court were once again 
transformed into an institution of judicial supervision and therefore the 
relevant position of the Supreme Court in the legal system was restored. 
 The provisions concerning the principle of concentration of the 
material submitted in court proceedings and the principle of immediacy 
were not subject to amendments, suspending the previously considered 
introduction of evidence preclusion before the court of first instance.  
The evidence preclusion before the court of second instance was 
reformulated. The courts could disregard new facts and evidence if the 
party could have presented them earlier or there was no need to take them 
into account (Article 381). The efficiency of the procedure was supposed  
to be provided by a number of procedural simplifications, accompanying 
the modification of guiding procedural principles. 
 Although most of the reforms of the Polish civil procedure conducted 
in 1996 were positively assessed by the legal community, some concerns 
were still being reported in relation to certain normative provisions. They 
included both arguments pointing to the need for far-reaching changes,  
as well as allegations of a too hasty removal of some socially important 
regulations277. In both cases, the previous experience and the procedural 
standards implemented in other European countries, including those which 
                                                   
277  See e.g.: T. Liszcz, Kontradyktoryjność i postępowanie sądowe w sprawach pracowniczych  
po zmianach kodeksu postępowania cywilnego [The Adversarial Principle and Court Proceedings  
in Employee Cases After the Amendments of the Code of Civil Procedure], Praca i Zabezpieczenie 
Społeczne [Labour and Social Security] 2005, no. 3, p. 20.  
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had undergone changes in recent years, were referred to. One of the topics 
which has provoked a permanent debate was the model of legal remedies, 
especially the appeal278. Equally in dispute was the matter of the 
formulation of procedural principles in relation to the requirement  
of the efficiency of civil procedure. 
 The point of reference for the further evolution, in the twenty-first 
century, of Polish civil procedure includes both the progressive 
consolidation of legislation in the member states of the European Union 
and the computerisation of society, as well as the need to increase  
the economic and social efficiency of the judicial protection of civil law 
relations, with particular emphasis on their new forms and types. 
 
 
                                                   
278 See: J. Gudowski, Pogląd na kasację [Opinion on the cassation], [in:] P. Grzegorczyk,  
K. Knoppek, M. Walasik (eds), Proces cywilny. Nauka-Kodyfikacja-Praktyka. Księga jubileuszowa 
dedykowana Profesorowi Feliksowi Zedlerowi [Civil Process. Doctrine-Codification-Practice. Jubilee 
Book Dedicated to Professor Feliks Zedler], Warszawa 2012, p. 149 et seq.; T. Wiśniewski,  
O swoistości postępowania kasacyjnego (zagadnienia wybrane) [The Specificity of Cassation 
Proceedings (Selected Issues)], [in:] P. Grzegorczyk, K. Knoppek, M. Walasik (eds), Proces 
cywilny. Nauka… [Civil Process. Doctrine...], pp. 377 et seq.; P. Grzegorczyk, Dopuszczalność  
i kształt apelacji – perspektywy przyszłej regulacji z uwzględnieniem standardów konstytucyjnych  
i międzynarodowych [Admissibility and Form of Appeal – Prospects for the Future Regulation With 
Regard to Constitutional and International Standards], conference materials from the National 
Congress of the Chairs and Institutes of Civil Procedure, 26-29.09.2013, Katowice.  
  
